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From the early 1860s Koreans appeared in the Russian Far East. Beginning in 
1864, Koreans who received approval of the Russian authorities had begun to 
establish Korean villages in this region. During the 1860s and 1870s, the Russian 
government favored the Koreans’ immigration into this area in order to develop the 
inhospitable lands in the Far East. After the 1880s, Russia’s contradictory tendencies 
of accepting the Korean immigrants or prohibiting them coexisted. Nonetheless, 
Korean immigration continuously increased until the mid 1920s. The number of 
Korean immigrants reached approximately 200,000 in 1937. During September and 
November of 1937 all Koreans living in the Far East were deported to Central Asia 
because of the potential suspicion that they would serve as spies for Japan.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
   
Russia’s colonization of its Far East formally started after 1858. Russia had 
obtained the Amur region in 1858 and the Maritime region (the Primorsky region) in 
1860, having signed the Treaties of Aigun and Peking with China. Since that time, 
Russia had begun to share the border with China in the Amur region, and with Korea 
in the Maritime region. As Russia struggled with colonizing the Far East, in particular 
the Maritime region due to its inhospitable environment, Koreans had appeared near 
the Russian-Korean border.  
From 1864 Korean immigrants noticeably increased and began to settle down 
into the Ussuri region which belonged to the Maritime. The number of Korean 
immigrants increased from 131 people in 1864 to about 200,000 in 1937. About 99 
percent of the total Korean population living in the territories of Russia was 
concentrated in the Far East; among these, 90 percent inhabited the Ussuri region 
adjacent to the Russian-Korean border.  
 During the 1800s, the repressive political and economic conditions in Korea, 
coupled with Russia’s need to develop the Far East, facilitated the Koreans’ migration. 
In the 1900s various political events began to affect the Koreans’ migration. While 
escaping from the desperate conditions of their homeland for a better life in Russia, 
most Koreans continued to suffer from difficulties just to survive there. The main 
causes of Koreans’ difficulties were the challenges in obtaining their own land and 
Russian citizenship. These problems were connected because those who had no 
Russian citizenship were not allowed to own land. In reality, in the mid 1920s about 
50 percent of the Korean population in the Far East had no land or owned less than 1 
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dessiatine of land.  
The political tension between Japan and the Soviet Union also negatively 
affected the Soviet regime in dealing with the Korean issue. The fact that most 
Koreans were concentrated in the border areas continuously irritated the Soviet 
regime. The Soviets were concerned that the Koreans would help Japan to perform 
operations against the Soviet regime. This concern led to the elimination of the 
Koreans from the border areas.     
 This thesis will cover the migration history of Koreans into Russia from the 
1860s to 1937, focusing on the history of the Koreans’ migration into the Russian Far 
East and their deportation to Central Asia. Why did Koreans abandon their fatherland 
and migrate into the undeveloped territories of Russia? What factors attracted Koreans 
to move into Russia? How did Koreans live in Russia? How did the tsarist and Soviet 
governments deal with the Koreans? Why were Koreans deported from the Far East to 
Central Asia? This thesis examines each of these questions in turn. 
Chapter I offers an overview of the history of the Koreans’ migration into the 
Far East. This chapter analyzes the historical background of the Korean migration into 
the Far East, how the migration developed, and what factors facilitated or deterred it. 
In addition, the chapter examines where Koreans came from, what kinds of jobs they 
engaged in, and what their lives were like in their new land.  
The first Koreans’ migration, under approval of local authorities, started in 
1864. While the overall trend of the Koreans’ migration spans from the 1860s to the 
1930s, in reality the Korean’ migration continuously increased into the mid 1920s. 
After the mid 1920s the Korean’ migration was officially prohibited by the Soviet 
Union’s immigration policy. In addition, the collectivization of agriculture caused the 
massive outflow of Koreans from the Far East. Nonetheless, during the 1920s and 
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1930s the number of Koreans in Russia steadily remained around 200,000 people.  
The various sources show a little different figure regarding the size of the 
Korean population. However, the difference between the sources is minor, and 
therefore, does not prevent an estimate of the overall tendency of population changes 
of Korean immigrants. This thesis uses sources provided by the Russian and Soviet 
governments. For reference, the various sources are attached as an appendix. 
Chapter I pays close attention to the political and economic factors involved 
in the changes of the Koreans’ migration. In particular, this work will explore how the 
historical events which took place in Russia, Korea, Japan, and China affected the 
Koreans’ migration. The Russo-Japanese War, the annexation of Korea by Japan, the 
First World War, the Soviet revolutions, the Russian Civil War, and the intervention of 
foreign countries in the Far East all affected, either negatively or positively, not only 
the Koreans’ migration, but the immigration policies of the tsarist and Soviet 
governments. 
In this first chapter the process of the Koreans’ migration is divided into three 
stages. The first stage reaches from the 1860s to June1884 when Korea and Russia 
concluded the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce. The second stage begins in 1884 
and finishes in 1917. The first and second stages belong to the tsarist government. The 
third stage deals with the issues that were prominent from 1917 to 1937. According to 
scholars, this stage is divided into four or five parts, focusing on the historical events 
related to both Russia and Korea. For example, the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) 
and the annexation of Korea by Japan (1910) define the stage in more detail.
1
 
However, in relation to the overall tendency of the Koreans’ migration, this stage is 
more simplified.  
                                           
1
 A.T. Kuzin, PerekhodKoreitsev Dalnego Vostochye predely Rossiiskogo gosudarstvo (Iuzhno-
Sakhalinsk, 2001). He divided the history of Korean immigration into five stages.  
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It is well known that most Koreans came from the northern parts of Korea. In 
reality, about 90 percent of the Korean immigrants were from these areas. 
Approximately 80 to 90 percent of the Koreans engaged in agriculture, and the rest of 
the population worked in the various industrial fields, including the gold-fields, 
mining, metallurgy, and so on. Of particular note, Koreans first introduced rice 
farming into the Far East in 1905 and developed it dramatically not only in this area, 
but in Central Asia.  
While Chapter I explores the development of the Koreans’ migration and 
Koreans’ lives in Russia, Chapter II examines the effects of the immigration policy of 
the tsarist Russian and Soviet governments on Koreans. In the first stage of the 
Koreans’ migration from the 1860s to the 1890s, the immigration policy of the tsarist 
government was initiated by the local authorities. The geographical distance of the 
Far East from the center made the central government indifferent to local affairs. 
Therefore, the immigration policy on Koreans heavily depended on the personality 
and private views of the local governors. After the 1900s, as the political and 
economic significance of this area was growing, the immigration policy became to be 
affected by the central government.  
While under the tsarist government the immigration policy on Koreans was 
sometimes favorable and sometimes negative, the immigration policy of the Soviet 
regime steadily showed negative and repressive tendencies. Under the Soviet regime 
many political events occurred which threatened the security of the regime. Therefore, 
its immigration policy had to be very passive, and the Koreans’ immigration was 
officially prohibited.  
During the Soviet regime, the Koreans living near the Russian-Korean border 
were viewed as dangerous elements since the Soviets thought Koreans could be useful 
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operatives for Japanese espionage. Therefore, the question of how to resettle the 
Koreans from border areas to other regions took priority in the Soviet government’s 
policy. In reality, the plan for the Koreans’ resettlement was crafted twice during the 
mid 1920s and early 1930s. According to the second plan, about 88,000 Koreans were 
to be resettled to Khabarovsk. The plans were only partially implemented, and as a 
result about 2,750 Koreans were resettled. The resettlement revived in a different 
form in the deportation of 1937.  
Finally, Chapter III describes the history of Koreans’ deportation to Central 
Asia. This chapter traces the factors that led to their tragic deportation, how Koreans 
were informed of their deportation, and how they were transferred to their new 
destination. In addition, this chapter examines how the central government 
implemented the deportation and how the local government prepared to accept 
Koreans.      
In 1937 all Koreans living in the Far East were deported, and their number 
reached about 172,000. Koreans were informed of their situation only days before 
their deportation. It was assumed by scholars that the deportation was caused by the 
Soviet regime’s suspicion of Koreans’ potential espionage for Japan. Japanese 
invasion in Manchuria in 1931 and the creation of the puppet government 
“Manchukuo” in 1932 escalated the tension between the two countries. In July of 
1937, Japan began to invade China.    
The Soviet regime recognized that the Far East was de facto at war with 
Japan. The Koreans were viewed as dangerous elements since they could be utilized 
as Japanese spies. As a result, in August 1937 the decree on deportation of Koreans 
was issued, and this operation finished in November 1937. Besides political concerns, 
 6 
 
some scholars
2
 insisted that economic reasons also influenced the Soviet regime’s 
decision to deport the Koreans. The argument was that for purposes of bringing rice 
farming to Central Asia and developing that region, the Soviet regime would carry out 
forced mass deportation. There was, however, weak evidence to back up this 
argument.  
In reality, it is difficult to believe that the Stalinist government deported mass 
populations within such a short period of three months merely to remove potential 
threats. Except for political implications, some reason should exist to cause the 
deportation. Given the fact, however, that the Soviet regime had a similar experience 
in 1935, the mere political implications could explain the deportation. As Germany’s 
threats increased in the western border, Germans and Poles were easily removed and 
transferred into Central Asia. 
Koreans were informed only days before their deportation that they would be 
moved to somewhere in Central Asia. According to the decree on 21 August, only 
Koreans living near the border areas were first deported starting at the end of 
September. However, as a new decree was adopted on 28 September, the deportation 
was expanded to all Koreans living in the Far East. As a result, about 172,000 
Koreans were deported to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and to other republics in 
Central Asia.  
Most Koreans were not allowed to carry sufficient amounts of food and were 
forced to leave their belongings behind. Koreans were loaded into wagons and 
transferred into Central Asia. During the transference which lasted one to two months, 
they faced the real possibility of death due to lack of food and medications. When 
they arrived in their destination, they realized that they were in a desperate situation. 
                                           
2
 Chae-mun Yi, Tongtoui diaspora (Taegu: GyungBuk University Press, 2007). Kho Song-moo, 
Koreans in the Soviet Central Asia (Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 1987). 
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Because the local governments were unprepared to accommodate them, the Koreans 
were forced to search for accommodations and food for themselves. The catastrophic 
situation continued in 1938.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE MIGRATION OF KOREANS TO THE RUSSIAN AND SOVIET FAR 
EAST: FROM THE 1860s TO THE 1930s 
 
1. Migration of the Koreans   
1.1. The First Phase: 1860 to 1884 
The history of Korean migration to the Russian Far East coincided with that 
of Russia’s colonization in this area. As Russia concluded the Treaties of Aigun in 
1858 and Peking in 1860 with China, Russia obtained the Amur and Ussuri regions 
which before had belonged to China. According to these treaties, Russia started 
sharing a border with China in the Amur region, while sharing a border with Korea in 
the Ussuri region.
3
  
Recognizing the need to colonize these areas by new settlers, between 1859 
and 1860 the Russian government first transferred the Cossacks from the Transbaikal 
area into the Amur and Ussuri regions. As a result, in 1862 twenty-three Cossack 
settlements were formed in the Ussuri region, and seventy-five in the Amur region. 
The number of Cossack settlers reached 5,000.
4
  
The Cossacks were given substantial benefits as initial settlers. Above all, 
they were given 197.7 dessiatine (one dessiatina = 2.7 acres) of land per household in 
exchange for carrying out army service as guards of the border areas.
5
 Since the 
Cossacks lacked experience in agriculture, however, less than 1 percent of their lands 
                                           
3
 Chae-mun Yi, 129. 
 
4
 Erich Thiel, The Soviet Far East (New York : Fedric A. Praeger, 1957), 134.  
 
5
 Haruki Wada, “Koreans in the Soviet Far East, 1917-1937,” in Dae-Sook Suh, ed., Koreans in the 
Soviet Union (Hawaii Honolulu: Center for Korean Studies of the University of Hawaii, 1987), 28.  
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were cultivated.
6
  
Along with the relocation of the Cossacks, the Russian government had 
prepared to resettle European Russians to the Far East. On 27 April 1861, the Russian 
tsarist government enacted a law to encourage and expedite the migration of the 
Russian peasants into the Amur and the Maritime Provinces (the Primorskia Oblast). 
According to the law, not only Russians but foreign immigrants were also 
granted various benefits from the government as new settlers. Based on the law, the 
new settlers in these areas were granted 100 dessiatine of land per household and were 
exempted from conscription for ten years and taxation for twenty years, on the 
condition that the transportation cost was to be paid by the settlers themselves.
7
  
Between 1862 and 1863 the first group of Russian migrants consisting of 
thirty-two families first moved into the Ussuri region. Subsequently, with support of 
the 1861 law, until 1882 about 14,000 Russian emigrants settled in several regions of 
the Russian Far East.
8
 
The figure, however, did not satisfy the expectation of the Russian 
government. The geographical barrier and long distance from European Russia to the 
Far East served to slow down the inflow of emigrants.
9
 In particular, the number of 
Russian emigrants into the South Ussuri region was insignificant for colonizing this 
area.
10
 
The unfavorable living conditions and the inhospitable soil conditions served 
as the main barriers to attracting Russian emigrants into the Ussuri region. From 1863 
                                           
6
 John Stephan, The Russian Far East (California: Stanford University Press, 1994), 63. 
 
7
 Ibid., 64. 
 
8
 Ibid., 64. 
 
9
 Thiel, 135. 
 
10
 A.I. Krushanov, Istoriia Dalnego Vostoka SSSR (Moskva: Nauka, 1991), 232.  
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to 1870 only 2,274 Russian peasants migrated to the South Ussuri area, and between 
1871 and 1882 the number of immigrants decreased to 622.
11
 The Posyet district 
belonging to the South Ussuri area, in particular, had much worse conditions and 
people who first landed in this area fled to other areas such as the adjacent Lake 
Kankha and Ussuri River.
12
  
Coinciding with Russia’s colonization of the Ussuri region in the 1860s, the 
Korean immigrants moved into this region. The first contacts of the Russian border 
authority with the Koreans took place naturally. After the Novgorodski post was 
established in Posyet Bay in 1860, which shared the Russian border with Korea, it 
was recorded that the Koreans, crossing the frozen Tumen River had begun contact 
with the Russian border authorities.  
According to the record of P.A.Gelmersen, who visited Posyet Bay in May 
1864 and surveyed the Koreans’ migration into this area, “Cherkavski, head of 
Novgorodski post, kept good relations with the Koreans, and therefore, the Koreans, 
crossing the Tumen River, had brought livestock to sell to the border authorities. In 
addition, the Koreans even suggested that if the Russian government permitted our 
families to settle down within the Russian border area, we would look for people who 
wanted to immigrate to Russia.
13
  
The first mention of the Koreans’ immigration to the Russian border areas 
was recorded in the letter written on 30 November 1863 by Lieutenant Rezanov who 
was in charge of the Novgorodski post, replacing Cherkavski. This letter was sent to 
Kazakevich, military governor of the Maritime region.  
                                           
11
 B.D. Pak, and N.F. Bugai, 140 let v Rossii (Moskva: IB RAN, 2004), 18. B.D.Pak, Koreitsy v 
Rossiiskoi Imperii (Moskva: 1993), 18. 
 
12
 Pak and Bugai, 18. 
 
13
 Ibid., 19. P.A. Gelmersen was staff-Lieutenant of General-Headquarters.  
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In the letter, Rezanov asked Kazakevich whether to permit Korean families to 
migrate into Russia, reporting that five or six houses had been constructed by Koreans 
near the Tizinhe River which was 15 versta (1 versta = 1,067m) away from the 
frontier post; about 20 Koreans wanted to move into these houses.
14
  
In response, Kazakevich approved acceptance of Koreans and ordered on 4 
April 1864 as below:
15
    
1) to take all measures to defend the security of the settlers into Russia; 
2) to treat the Koreans based on the Russian laws, unless they violated its 
laws. 
 
Prior to receiving the answer from Kazakevich, Rezanov first of all gave the 
Koreans permits to settle down in this area after February 1864. They were considered 
the first permanent Korean immigrants, with the approval of the Russian authority. By 
the autumn of 1864 about 140 Koreans immigrated and formed the settlement in the 
South Ussuri area, which was called Tizinkhe and was viewed as the first Korean 
village. After 1864 the Koreans had begun to form new Korean settlements, named 
Yanchikhe and Sidimi which were located in the Posyet area.
16
 
It is reasonable, therefore, to calculate that 1864 was the year when the first 
group of Korean immigrants settled in the Russian Far East. Even before 1860 the 
Koreans appeared in the Posyet region and “raised grains like millet and harvested 
kelp along the Primorye coast.”17 However, they were not considered permanent 
                                           
14
 Ibid., 19. 
 
15
 Ibid., 19. 
 
16
 Ibid., 21.  
 
17
 John Stephan, The Russian Far East (Standford, CA: Standford University Press, 1994), 74. 
 12 
 
immigrants in that they did not aim at settling there.   
The initial immigrants who during the 1860s came to the Russian Far East 
were mainly peasants residing in the northern part of Korea. They fled to the Russian 
Far East to avoid the economic difficulties caused by famine, punitive taxation, and 
tyranny of government officers and landowners. Another reason that provoked the 
Koreans to migrate to this area was the geographical proximity between the Far East 
and the northern part of Korea. The Tumen River which crossed the Russian-Korean 
border, furthermore, was so shallow that it did not prevent the Koreans from passing 
through the border.  
The third reason Koreans were attracted to this area was that they came to 
know through the Russian border authorities about the benefits offered by the law 
enacted in 1861 to encourage emigration into the Far East.
18
 Risking their lives, the 
Koreans began to rush into this area. At that time, the Korean government prohibited 
crossing the Russian border and, if people were captured by the government, they 
would be executed according to the Korean law.
19
     
The Korean government took a very negative stance on the immigration of its 
people to the Russian Far East. As the number of Korean immigrants rapidly 
increased between 1863 and 1864, the Korean government requested the Russian 
government to send the Koreans back to Korea. The Russian side refused the request 
of the Korean government since Russia well understood that if the Koreans were 
returned, they were sentenced to death. The Koreans also desperately resisted their 
                                           
18
 A.I. Petrov, Koreiskaia Diaspora na Dalnem Vostoke Rossii (Vladivostok: DVO RAN, 2000), 60. 
 
19
 T.Z. Pozniak, Inostrannye Podannye v gorodakh Dalnego Vostoka Rossii (Vladivostok: Dalauka, 
2004), 55. 
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return to Korea.
20
 
Contrary to the position of the Korean government, the Russian government 
was in the position to support the Koreans’ immigration to the Ussuri region. In 
November 1864, Korsakov, Governor-General of Eastern Siberia ordered Kazakevich, 
governor of the Maritime region, to ensure that the local authority secured the Korean 
immigrants and provided them with special food, given the importance of the 
immigration into this area and the strong inclination of Koreans to settle.
21
   
By 1866 the number of Korean immigrants reached 546 people. The first 
census of Korean immigrants was carried out on 1 January 1867 by F. F. Busse by 
order of the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia. According to the census, in 1867 
the total number of Koreans who settled in the South-Ussuri area was 999 people (185 
families).
22
 
 During 1867, 500 Koreans and another 150 families crossed the border 
without the authorization of the Korean government and settled in both the Yanchikhe 
and Vladivostok areas. The land located on the right side of upstream of the Suifen 
River was allotted to the Korean immigrants.
23
 
As the number of Korean immigrants increased, the Russian authority took 
appropriate measures to control the Korean settlers in the South Ussuri region. On 13 
August 1866 Korsakov instructed the governor of the Maritime region to introduce 
the following regulations:
24
 
1) The Koreans who lived in the South Ussuri region were to be controlled by 
                                           
20
 Chae-mun Yi, 130. 
 
21
 B.D. Pak, Rossiia i Koreia (Moskva: IB RAN, 2004), 81. 
 
22
 Ibid., 81.  
 
23
 Pak and Bugai, 25. 
 
24
 Pak, Rossiia i Koreia, 82-83. 
 14 
 
the head of the Novgorodskii post; 
2) Every village which consisted of more than 10 households should select 
one representative and two advisers; 
3) The representatives should be instructed by the head of the post. They were 
also to be given the right to punish the people who violated the rules and to 
handle minor matters within the Korean villages. 
 
Along with the increase of Korean immigrants, the Korean government began 
to strengthen the surveillance over the border areas. Regarding the policy of the 
Korean government on the Korean immigrants, the famous Russian explorer 
Przhevalskii, who visited the South Ussuri region during 1867-1869, mentioned in his 
book that “the Korean government tried to stop the migration by all means available, 
executed people caught crossing the border, and refused to hold any official contacts 
with the Russian government.”25  
On the other hand, in the 1860s the policy of the Russian government on 
Korean immigrants was consistent and favorable. Due to lack of Russian emigrants in 
this area, and despite the protest of the Korean government, the Russian authority was 
willing to support the Koreans in settling in the Russian Far East where the living 
conditions were so bad that the Russian settlers easily abandoned and left this area.  
Even the governor of the Maritime region, Kazakevich, suggested that Russia 
allow the Koreans to register for status as Russian peasants, given the fact that Russia 
and Korea had no treaty, and therefore, Russia itself could allow Koreans to have 
Russian citizenship without the consent of Korea.
26
 
                                           
25
 Ibid., 84. 
 
26
 Ibid., 177. 
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In response to this suggestion, Korsakov issued the following regulations 
prepared in 1864:
27
 
1) There was no treaty between Russia and Korea to regulate the migration 
issue of the Koreans. However, according to Russian law, the Russian 
authority could not deny the people who wanted to be Russian citizens.  
2) The Koreans who migrated to Russia were to be secured by Russian law. 
 
Despite the effort of the Korean government to discourage the migration, the 
number of Korean immigrants consistently increased throughout the 1860s. According 
to Przhevalskii, in 1867, 1,801 Koreans (995 men and 806 women) lived in the three 
Korean villages of Tizinkhe, Yanchikhe, and Sidimi. In addition, the description of 
Przhevalskii on the life of Korean immigrants showed that the majority of Koreans 
came from the northern part of Korea, and they raised 18 horses and 398 pigs, and 
cultivated 395 dessiatine of land.
28
 
The years of 1869 and 1870 were recorded as large migration years for the 
Koreans. The flooding of the northern part of Korea caused bad harvests and 
desperate famine. Several thousand Koreans were forced to leave their fatherland in 
search of newly opened land in order to survive. As a result, between June and 
December of 1869, approximately 6,500 Koreans moved into this area.
29
  
Among new Korean immigrants, two-thirds had no food for themselves. The 
Russian authorities provided them with emergency food including 4,000 pud (1 pud = 
                                           
27
 Ibid, 178. 
 
28
 Pak, Koreitsy v Rossiiskoi Imperii, 22. 
 
29
 Chae-mun Yi, 136-7.  
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16.38 kg) of rye and 2,000 pud of wheat flour and grain.
30
 The Russian authorities, 
however, were irritated by the deteriorating situation, and began to recognize that the 
massive inflow of the Korean immigrants might cause economic and political 
uncertainty in the area.
31
  
Regarding the mass inflow of Koreans, after visiting the Ussuri region, 
Przhevalskii suggested that the migration be stopped temporarily or that the Koreans 
be resettled to the Suifen River, Lake Khanka, and Amur regions which were far away 
from the Russian-Korean border. He also expressed his concern about the Koreans 
maintaining strong emotional ties with their fatherland, and suggested that the Korean 
immigrants should be put among Russians so that they would be easily russianized by 
learning the Russian culture, language, and customs.
32
    
From 1869, new Korean immigrants started to settle into the basins of the 
Suifen and Suchan rivers. By 1872 the Koreans formed a total of 13 Korean villages 
in the Suifen, Khanka, and Suchan districts within the South Ussuri area, where a total 
of 3,473 Koreans (1850 men, 1,623 women) lived and cultivated 1,190 dessiatine of 
land.
33
  
1) Suifen district: Tizinkhe, Yanchikhe, Sidimi, Peresheyek, Timukhe; 
2) Khanka district: Korsakov (280 Koreans), Putsylovka, Krounovsk, 
Sinelnikovka (93 people),  Pokrovka (490 people), 
Kazakevichevka(490 people); 
3) Suchan district:  Piankov, Vasiliev.  
                                           
30
 Pak and Bugai, 29. 
 
31
 Pak, Rossiia i Koreia, 86. 
 
32
 Wada, 26. 
 
33
 Pak and Bugai, 36-37. 
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While the Korean immigrants first settled in the Ussuri region in 1864, the 
first Korean settlement in the Amur region was formed only after 1871. After visiting 
the South Ussuri area in 1870, Sinelnikov, the newly appointed Governor-General of 
Eastern Siberia, decided to resettle Koreans who recently moved into the Ussuri 
region to the Amur region.  
Based on this decision, in 1871 103 Korean families (431 people) migrated to 
Blagoveshchenko. The Koreans received 100 dessiatine of land and there formed a 
new Korean village called Blagoslovennoe. It was regarded as the first Korean village 
established in the Amur area.
34
   
The reason that Sinelnikov relocated the Koreans to the Amur region with the 
offer of substantial benefits to the Koreans could well be explained by the letter sent 
to Sinelnikov on 9 January 1870 by Stremoukhov, director of the Asian department of 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the letter, Stremoukhov pointed out that, even though 
Russia welcomed Korean immigrants to settle in the Far East, it would be undesirable 
to have most Korean immigrants concentrated on the border areas.
35
 
The Russian government felt a certain burden due to the Korean migration 
issue. The first relocation of Korean immigrants from the border area to other areas 
was likely carried out under political considerations. The issue of relocating the 
Koreans from the border area into inland areas within the Ussuri region or other 
provinces like the Amur region continuously revived whenever the Russian 
government viewed the Korean migration as problematic. 
The transferring of Koran immigrants into the Amur region caused concern 
among the Chinese border authority since the place where the Korean immigrants 
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were transferred was close to the border area with China. The Chinese border 
authority asked the Russian authority to return the Koreans. Its request, however, was 
rejected by the Russian government. Gorchakov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
delivered the instruction to Sinelnikov that the Koreans need not be transferred 
because there was no treaty among Russia, China, and Korea.
36
           
Nonetheless, the number of Korean immigrants increased throughout the 
1870s. According to the census on the Korean immigrants carried out in 1878 by 
order of Frederiks, the new Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, 6,142 Korean 
immigrants inhabited the South Ussuri area where twenty Korean settlements were 
formed. In the Amur region, in 1879 624 Koreans lived in the village of 
Blagoslovennoe.
37
 In total, by the end of the 1870s there were twenty-one Korean 
villages with 6,766 people in the Ussuri and the Amur region.    
Accepting the Korean immigrants into the Russian Far East during the 1860s 
and 1870s positively affected the local economy. The agricultural industry rapidly 
developed and its productions exceeded the expectation of the Russian authority. Even 
in 1870 grain prices in the South Ussuri area dropped due to overproduction of grains. 
Some grains such as oats and barley were no longer imported from China after 1874. 
In addition, the Koreans were mobilized to construct roads, houses, and bridges.
38
  
Russian historian V. Vagin, in his article titled “Koreans in Amur,” perceived 
that the Koreans would be very useful for the Russian economy because they were 
industrious, tidy, humble, and obedient. He stated that it would be harmful for Russia 
to view Koreans only as a simple labor force working to serve Russia’s agricultural 
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and economic interests, and stressed that Russia should view the presence of Koreans 
as favorable for Russian politics.
39
     
 
1.2. The Second Phase: 1884-1917 
In the 1880s a certain tendency of the Russian government to restrict the 
Korean migration appeared. On the one hand, the Russian government attempted to 
lay the legal foundation to regulate the Korean immigration into the Russian Far East. 
Finally, on 25 June 1884 Russia and Korea concluded a Treaty of Friendship and 
Commerce, by which the diplomatic relations of the two countries were established. 
The status of the Korean immigrants was clarified by the treaty.  
As a result, during the 1880s the rate of Korean immigrants slowed down. 
The Russian government also considered the positions of Korea and China since 
Korea and China strongly opposed the Russian government allowing the Koreans to 
settle in the border areas within the Russian Far East. 
On the other hand, in order to attract Russians into the South Ussuri area 
which the Koreans densely populated, the Russian government had earlier issued the 
South Ussuri Resettlement Law on 1 June 1882. The law targeted the Russian 
peasants who lived in the southern part of European Russia. According to the law, the 
settlers were entitled to receive 15 dessiatine of land per person with a maximum 100 
dessiatine per family, plus, five years of tax exemption, and free tools, construction 
materials, and agricultural implements. Unlike the 1862 law, the transportation from 
Odessa to Vladivostok was paid by the government.
40
        
Thanks to the resettlement law, between 1883 and 1885 about 4,710 Russian 
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peasants from European Russia moved into the South Ussuri area. These mostly poor 
peasants were given the land and credited a maximum 600 rubles per family from the 
national fund to be paid off in 33 years.
41
 In addition to this group, the group of 
voluntary immigrants which consisted of rich peasants settled in the Ussuri region. 
Their number reached 1,474 families (8,998 people) from 1884 to 1900.
42
 
The total Russian population in the Maritime province increased from 8,385 
people in 1882 to 66,320 people in 1902. During the same period, the number of 
Korean immigrants in the Maritime Province increased only from 10,137 people to 
32,380 people.
43
 The rate of increase of the Russian population overwhelmed that of 
the Korean population.   
In 1907 the number of Russian peasants who arrived in the Far East from 
Ukraine, Siberia, and central Russia reached 243,000.
44
 The Russian settlers, 
however, had difficulty in adapting to the inhospitable environments of the Far East, 
and about 15 percent of Russian settlers who settled in the Maritime region 
abandoned their allotments and returned to European Russia or left for other 
hospitable lands, while 7.5 percent of Russian settlers in the Amur region left this 
area.
45
    
The main feature of Korean migration in the 1880s was that various classes of 
Koreans began to join the line of migration. In fact, while during the 1860s and 1870s 
the Korean immigrants were mainly peasants, in the 1880s merchants and simple 
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laborers began to constitute one part of the Korean immigrants.
46
 
The gradual increase of Korean immigration was attributed to the needs of the 
Russian government to develop not only agriculture but the mining industry. Since the 
Koreans had special skills in rice farming and also were very diligent and industrious, 
they made a significant contribution to the agricultural sector in the Maritime 
Province. In fact, about 90 percent of the Korean immigrants engaged in agriculture.
47
  
Contrary to the previous Korean migration, the 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s saw 
many Korean political refugees move into the Far East. The Japanese expansionism 
into Korea began to strictly suppress Korean activists who fought against Japan.  
The political situation in the 1890s and 1900s fostered the Korean migration 
into Russia. The number of Korean immigrants in the Maritime region in 1902 almost 
doubled that of Korean immigrants in 1891 (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: The Number of Korean Immigrants in the Maritime Region
48
 
Year Koreans 
1891 12,857 
1898 23,000 
1899 27,000 
1902 32,380 
 
 
In the early 1900s there were 47 or 48 Korean villages in the Far East. Only 
in the Maritime Province were 32 Korean villages formed, and among them 31 
villages were concentrated in the South Ussuri district. Of 32 Korean villages in the 
Maritime Province, 22 villages belonged to the Posyet area, 4 to the Suifen area, 2 to 
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the Upper-Ussurisk area, 3 the Suchan area, and 1 to the Sofisk area.
49
     
In addition to the Maritime Province, Korean villages were established in 
Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchenko, and Blagoslovennoe of the Amur region. In 
Blagoslovennoe, the first Korean village of the Amur region, Korean immigrants 
increased from 431 people in 1872 to 1,100 in 1895. They all were baptized and 
obtained Russian citizenship in 1889 regardless of their ability to speak the Russian 
language. They were considered the example of successful russification.
50
    
While the Korean immigration of the 1800s was caused mainly by economic 
reasons such as famines and starvation, between 1900 and 1910 the political situation 
in Korea served as the main reason for the Korean immigration. As Japanese 
repression toward Koreans increased, the Koreans were forced to abandon their 
fatherland and move into the Russian Far East, adjacent to Korea.  
From the 1900s Japan began to strengthen its influence on Korea’s internal 
affairs. On the one hand, Japan severely repressed political activities of Koreans 
opposed to Japan in order to accomplish complete control over Korea. On the other 
hand, Japan confiscated land and properties from Koreans to facilitate Japanese 
immigration into Korea. As a result, many Koreans, including the elite group, were 
forced to leave Korea and settle in the Russian Far East, where the power of Japan 
was limited by the authority of Russia.  
Between 1906 and 1910 the number of Koreans increased from 34,399 people 
to 50,965
51
 (see Table 2).  
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Table 2:  The Increase Rate of Koreans Living in the Maritime Province 1906-1910 
YEAR RUSSIAN KOREANS FOREIGN KOREANS TOTAL 
1906 16,965 17,434 34,399 
1907 16,007 29,907 45,914 
1908 16,190 29,307 45,497 
1909 14,799 36,755 51,544 
1910 17,080 33,885 50,965 
 Note: G.N. Kim made this table, based on the report of Unterberger, 
Governor-General of Priamurskii Krai.  
 
 
However, it was almost impossible to do an annual count of immigrants, and 
therefore, various sources showed different figures. A. M. Kazarinova who carried out 
the census on the Koreans in the South Ussuri region between 1906 and 1907 pointed 
out that the number of Koreans living in the Maritime region might reach 60,000 in 
1908.
52
  
Except for the Maritime region, only a small number of Koreans inhabited in 
the Amur and Transbaikal provinces. In 1910 about 1,538 Koreans lived in the Amur 
region, and 378 Koreans lived in Transbaikal Province.
53
 This figure well 
demonstrates that most Koreans were concentrated on the border areas close to Korea. 
After 1910, when Korea was annexed by Japan, not only Korean peasants 
who were deprived of their land by the Japanese Land Exploitation Policy, but also 
the members of the upper classes, businessmen and many political figures who led the 
independence movement in Korea, began immigrating to Russia. In addition, the fact 
that the Russian-Korean border was almost open facilitated the Korean migration.      
From 1911 to 1914, the number of Korean immigrants increased only from 
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57,289 to 64,309.
54
 Even during the First World War, the number of Korean 
immigrants into the Russian Far East continued to increase.  
Between 1915 and 1917 the number of Koreans living in the Far East 
increased from 72,600 people to 84,678. Of this number, about 87 percent (74,079 
people) lived in the rural areas, indicating that most Koreans continued to engage in 
agriculture. Although some Koreans left Russia to avoid conscription into the Russian 
army, the tendency of population increase persistently continued throughout 1910s.
55
 
Concerning the number of Koreans, however, it was argued that Koreans 
already numbered approximately 100,000 in 1917 in the Far East.
56
 The difference 
between the real number and the registered number could be explained by the fact that 
the Koreans were reluctant to register with the Russian authorities, and the number of 
Koreans who stayed illegally might reach almost 30 percent of the total number of 
Koreans.
57
 
Throughout the 1910s the issue of obtaining Russian citizenship annoyed the 
Korean immigrants. The number of Koreans who became Russian citizens did not 
improve noticeably. While in 1910, of 50,965 Koreans only 17,080 obtained Russian 
citizenship, in 1914, of 64,309 Koreans only 20,109 succeeded in gaining Russian 
citizenship. 
In other words, two-thirds of the Korean immigrants were regarded as 
foreigners and among them a substantial amount was presumed to be staying illegally 
with no documents to prove their identity. This situation served as the main factor in 
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unsettling the Korean society in Russia.  
In fact, non-naturalized Koreans suffered substantial discrimination, 
compared to the Russian citizens. They were not allowed to have land and were 
limited in their search for work due to their status. They were forced to work as tenant 
farmers or lower wage labors. They had to pay 50 percent of their yields as land lease 
fees to the landowners. In addition, they suffered various taxes such as a residential 
tax or oil and fuel taxes.
58
  
The Cossacks were placed on the top rank of the social hierarchy in the Far 
East since they were first granted huge lands from the government. Not cultivating the 
allotted lands, the Cossacks simply leased their lands to the Koreans who could be 
hired at the cheapest wage. The Russians were also given the land from the 
government when they migrated into the Far East
59
 (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3: The Size of Land Allotted to Settlers in the Far East  
Nationalities Size of the Land given by the Government 
Cossacks 197.7 dessiatine 
Russian immigrants (1862-1900) 100 dessiatine 
Russian immigrants (after 1901) 15-45 dessiatine 
Korean (Category 1) 15 dessiatine 
Korean (Category2-3) 0 
 Note: Only Koreans who settled in the Blagoslovennoe in 1871 by the 
Russian government were given 100 dessitine of land per household. 
 
 
1.3. The Third Phase: 1917-1937 
During the period of 1917 to 1922, the 1917 Russian revolutions and the 
Japanese intervention in the Far East between 1918 and 1922 affected the Korean 
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population not only in the Far East but in the whole of Russia. Ironically, dangerous 
circumstances attracted the Korean immigrants to flee into Russia. In order to fight 
against Japan, Korean partisan groups entered the Far East. The Russian Koreans also 
joined the Red Army to support the Soviet Bolshevik regime. 
The Bolshevik regime provided material support to the Korean independence 
movement, recognizing that the support from the Korean side would be useful and 
important in defeating the Japanese troops and the White army. The Korean 
immigrants established the Korean National Union and systematically collaborated 
with the newly born Soviet government. This mutually favorable atmosphere 
contributed to the increase of Korean immigrants.  
After the 1917 Russian October revolution about 100,000 Koreans were 
supposed to inhabit the whole of Russia: in the Maritime Province, 81,825 people; in 
European Russia, 7,000; in Western Siberia, 5,000.
60
 Two-thirds of the Koreans were 
likely to have no legal status. 
During the Russian Civil War, the inflow of the Korean immigrants into the 
Far East began to increase. The reasons for the increase of Korean immigrants could 
be explained by several causes: First, the political and economic condition in Korea 
worsened and continuously compelled people to leave the country. Second, the 
Korean migration to the Manchuria region decreased due to the increase of Japan’s 
suppression in this area, and therefore Koreans’ immigration was concentrated on the 
Far East. Third, for the Koreans the Far East was considered to still have potential to 
provide land and work for Koreans.   
Another realistic reason to attract the Koreans was the increased demands for 
rice. During the period of the presence of Japanese troops in the Far East from 1918 to 
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1922, the demand for rice rapidly grew, and this situation offered work to Korean 
immigrants and laborers. In fact, rice farming was first introduced into the Far East by 
Koreans in 1905. The size of the rice fields in the Maritime Province increased only 
from 300 dessiatine in 1919 to 10,000 dessiatine in 1923. Almost 90 percent of rice 
farming in this area was performed by Koreans.
61
  
According to the materials provided by the Far Eastern Revolutionary 
Committee on the Korean problem, in 1923, about 120,982 Koreans lived in the 
Maritime Province, of whom 103,482 lived in rural areas. Among Koreans, the 
peasants constituted 80 percent of the total Korean population. About 5 percent were 
laborers, and 5 to 7 percent were considered the intelligentsia. About 10 percent 
belonged to the urban bourgeoisie. Among the peasants, 5 percent were considered 
Kulak. In addition, about 90,000 Koreans were concentrated on three uezd (districts): 
Posyet, Suchan and Nikolsk-Ussurisk, constituting 80 percent of the whole Korean 
population
62
 (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Koreans Living in the Rural Areas of the Maritime Province in 1923 
Raion, Uezd Russian Koreans Foreign Koreans Total 
Posyetskii 14,371 13,610 27,981 
Nikolsk-Ussuriskii 7,621 28,354 35,975 
Suchanskii 2,302 19,342 21,644 
Spasskii 2,896 4,294 7,190 
Olginskii 14 2,199 2,213 
Imanskii 1,848 1,402 3,250 
Khabarovskii Uezd 2,091 3,138 5,229 
Totals 31,143 72,339 103,482 
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In 1923, according to another source, 106,817 Koreans inhabited the 
Maritime Province. Koreans constituted 17 percent of the whole population in this 
area. Among Koreans, 34,559 people were naturalized and 72,258 were regarded as 
foreigners.
63
 
In early 1924, there were 457 Korean villages in the Maritime Province 
where 70 Korean rural soviets (local governing councils) were formed.
64
 In mid 1924, 
105 Korean rural soviets were established, and in 1925 the number increased to 122.
65
    
Between 1923 and 1926 the number of Koreans living in the Maritime region 
increased from 120,982 to 168,009. Of 168,009, 123,000 Koreans lived in the Ussuri 
region.
66
  In 1926, only in the Vladivostok district were 164 Korean villages formed. 
Also in 1926, it was first recorded that 87 Koreans were registered in Central Asia: 42 
in Kazakhstan, 36 in Uzbekistan, 9 Kirgizstan.
67
  
In 1929, the special survey on the number of Korean immigrants living in the 
Vladivostok district was carried out by the instruction of the Far Eastern Regional 
Committee. According to this survey, about 150,795 Koreans were counted living in 
this area. 
However, some sources showed significantly different figures. Walter Kolarz 
insisted in his book titled “The Peoples of the Soviet Far East” that when illegal or 
unregistered Korean residents were included, in 1927 about 250,000 lived in the 
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Soviet Union.
68
 Another source claimed that as of 1925, about 250,000 Koreans lived 
in the territories of the Far East, with 50 percent living in the Vladivostok uezd.
69
 
Given the situation that the Russian authority’s control over the entry and exit 
of Korean immigrants was insufficient, and above all Koreans’ reluctance to register 
with the Russian authorities, the census could not be regarded as 100 percent accurate, 
but this figure seemed not to be overly exaggerated. The Russian officers themselves 
confessed that 14 to 30 percent should be added to the surveyed figure to arrive at the 
real figure.
70
  
Throughout the 1920s the issue of granting Russian citizenship to Koreans 
was still not decided. On 25 October 1922 the Far Eastern Revolutionary Committee, 
which was formed right after Japan withdrew its troops from the Far East, began to 
review the Korean issue, creating the new department in 1923. The process of 
granting Russian citizenship to the Koreans, nonetheless, developed slowly.   
In 1923, of 6,000 Korean applicants who wanted to get Russian citizenship 
only 1,300 received it. In 1924, 4,761 made application for Russian citizenship; of 
them, 1,247 Koreans succeeded. In 1925, of 3,265 Koreans who made application for 
citizenship, only 2,200 received it.
71
 
In the 1930s no noticeable change of the number of Korean immigrants 
appeared, attributed to the fact that the Soviet regime strengthened its guard of the 
border areas not only with Korea but with China and Manchuria. In addition, the 
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political situation caused the Soviet regime to take unfavorable measures on the 
Korean issue. Official records showed that the number of Korean immigrants reached 
195,000 in 1935, and dropped to 172,500 in 1937.
72
  
Throughout the 1930s, the political situation in the Far East worsened due to 
the heightened tension between Japan and China, and between Japan and Russia 
concerning Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and the issue of ownership of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway. These conditions affected the decision of the Soviet government to 
prohibit further Korean immigration into the Far East.  
 
2. Who were the Koreans? And What were the Economic and Social 
Conditions of Korean Immigrants in Tsarist Russian and the Soviet 
Regime?  
 
The Koreans who migrated from Korea into the Russian and Soviet Far East 
were mainly peasants, primarily from the northern part of Korea. According to the 
record provided by the Korean government, of those who immigrated from Korea to 
the Far East between 1910 and 1921, 90.7 percent came from the Northern provinces 
of Korea such as Hamgyung Nam-Buk Do, Pyungan Nam-Buk Do and Hwanghae Do, 
while immigrants from the remaining regions of Korea constituted less than 10 
percent. This ratio reflects the geographical proximity of northern Koreans to the 
Russian Far East.
73
  
 The Koreans’ initial migration into the Far East was made overland. In 
contrast, for the migration from the central and southern parts of Korea sea routes 
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were used, from Chongjin and Pusan in Korea or Kobe in Japan to Vladivostok.
74
 
Most Koreans moved into Russia in order to escape suppression under 
Korea’s feudal system and the small ruling classes, and also to escape to Japan’s 
invasion in Korea. However, the Koreans’ economic and social conditions in Russia 
were not different from those they experienced in Korea since most Koreans in Russia 
were not given Russian citizenship and therefore they were not entitled to own land. 
In 1923, of 16,767 Korean households only 2,290 (13.7 percent) owned their land.
75
 
The Koreans who did not own land were forced to rent the land from the Cossacks 
and Russians.  
By 1917, the lands in the Far East were concentrated in the hands of the 
Cossacks and the Russians, with their holdings being 15 to 44 times greater than those 
of Koreans (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Land Ownership of Russians, Cossacks, and Koreans in 1917 (unit: 
dessiatine)
76
 
 Number of households 
(ratio, %) 
Good quality of land 
(ratio, %) 
Size of land per 
household (ratio, %) 
Cossacks and Russians 
migrated before 1900 
18,787 (32.91) 1,269,300 (71.11) 67 
Russians after 1900 21,112 (36.98) 489,700 (27.43) 23 
Koreans 17,192 (30.11) 26,100 (1.46) 1.5 
Total 57,091 (100%) 1,785,100 (100%)  
 
 In comparing the size of land ownership in the Far East in 1923, while the 
Cossacks and Russians owned 16.5 and 10.5 dessiatine of land per person respectively, 
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Koreans owned only 1 to 1.5 dessiatine of land per person.
77
  
As the number of naturalized Koreans grew, the land problems of Koreans 
slightly improved. Although the ratio of Koreans who owned land highly increased, 
about 50 percent of the Korean population still owned less than one dessiatine of land. 
Since about 80 to 90 percent of the whole Korean population was engaged in the 
agricultural sector, the land problem seriously limited the development of the Korean 
society in Russia (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Ratio of Land Ownership Between Russians and Koreans in 1924
78
 
 Ratio of land ownership of 
Koreans 
Ratio of land ownership of 
Russians 
no land 11.5% 12.5% 
less than one dessiatine of 
land 
36% 12.3% 
1 to 2 dessiatine of land 26%  
2 to 4 dessiatine of land 18.9% 24.9% 
5 to 7 dessiatine of land 5.5% 31.4% 
more than 7 dessiatine of 
land 
1.5% 17.1% 
 
 
Besides agriculture, Koreans engaged in mining, transportation, and work in 
the gold-fields. The number of Korean laborers who worked in the mining industry 
increased significantly from 400 in 1891 to 6,200 in 1906. However, Koreans who 
worked in the gold-fields decreased from 5,865 people in 1906 to 150 in 1910. This 
unexpected decrease was due to the policy launched by Unterberger, who regarded 
Koreans’ inclination to settle down in Russia as dangerous.79 Also, notable was the 
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fact that the number of Koreans who worked in the mining industry in the Amur 
region dropped from 30,000 in 1907 to 1,300 people in 1924, while the number of 
Chinese mine workers increased during that time to 19,300 people.
80
  
During the Soviet regime, Koreans increased their participation in political 
activities. After the February Revolution of 1917, Koreans established the Russian-
Korean Central Union. The Koreans were divided into two groups in the beginning; 
one supported the Provisional government and the other favored the Bolshevik regime. 
While the rich peasants and merchants supported the policy of the Provisional 
government and even the White Army, most Koreans supported the Bolshevik regime 
since they hoped that the Bolshevik regime would give more benefits to landless 
Koreans.  
In April 1918 the Koreans reunited to establish the single Korean 
organization named All Russian Korean National Association, which was renamed as 
the Korean National Council in 1919. Under the leadership of this organization 
Koreans fought against the White Army and Japan. Besides this organization, many 
Korean partisan armies fought for the Soviet regime. However, after 1922, when the 
Bolshevik regime took complete power in the Far East, the Koreans’ political and 
military organizations which were supposed to be involved in carrying out anti-
Japanese activities were closed. This measure came in response to Japan’s protest that 
the Korean organizations in the Far East organized armed resistance against Japan. In 
contrast, the number of Korean Communist members reached 372 people in 1929, and 
Komsomol members numbered 6,258.
81
 
In 1920s the economic conditions of the Koreans were not improved. One 
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letter written by A. F. Tsai on 25 December 1922, asked for material assistance for the 
Korean society and explained the economic situations of Koreans. According to this 
letter, about 200,000 Koreans lived in the Far East, among them 50 percent owned 
land; in reality this consisted of only two to three dessiatine of land, even though they 
were entitled to a minimum of 15 dessiatine of land. In addition, most Koreans 
suffered in their efforts to develop rice cultivation due to lack of irrigation and 
seeds.
82
 
Those who did not own land suffered double pains since they not only had to 
pay the rental fees, but governmental taxes as well, even though they were foreigners. 
Further, they had to buy tickets to remain in Russia, at 12.5 rubles per family. Rental 
fees varied from 47 rubles per one dessiatine to 70 rubles according to regions. In the 
worst cases, rental fees increased in one year from 9 to 10 pud of rice per one 
dessiatine to 15 to 20 pud.
83
 
Despite these adverse conditions, Koreans contributed to the significant 
development of the agricultural sector in the Far East. In particular, rice cultivation 
rapidly increased throughout 1920s, from 8,196 hectares in 1925 to 17,855 hectares in 
1929, while harvest of rice rose from 23,114 ton in 1925-26 to 45,765 ton in 1928-
29.
84
 However, during the process of the collectivization, rice cultivation decreased to 
4,200 hectares in 1933.
85
 The yield per hectare dropped from 3,000 kg to 1,300 or 
1,400 kg.
86
 This change demonstrates that many Koreans left the Kolkhoz because 
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about 90 percent of the rice cultivation in the Far East was handled by the Koreans.  
Besides rice farming, Koreans were engaged in sericulture. Sericulture started 
to be practiced by Koreans between 1916 and 1917. In 1925 and 1926 when the 
Soviet regime imported, respectively, 300,000 and 1,200,000 mulberry trees from 
Korea, sericulture was rapidly developed. The number of households engaged in 
sericulture increased from 100 households in 1929 to 10,200 households in 1933.
87
 
Also, Koreans first introduced soybeans into the Far East. The acreage devoted to 
soybeans was expected to reach 80,000 hectares in 1937, compared to only 300 
hectares before the First World War.
88
 
In addition, the number of Koreans who worked in the fishery cooperatives 
reached 5,000 in the early 1930s.
89
 After the collectivization, a substantial number of 
Koreans moved out of the Kolkhoz and became urban laborers. Furthermore, as a 
result of receiving a high education, the number of professionals such as teachers and 
officials gradually increased. In 1932 the first Korean drama theater was created and 
six Korean magazines and seven newspapers were published in the Korean language. 
As a result, several hundred Korean artists, journalists and writers began to flourish.
90
   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
 
87
 Pak and Bugai, 228.  
 
88
 Yn Gieng Be, “Uchastie Koreitsev v pazbitii ekonomiki Dalegovostochnogo regiona (20-30-e gody 
XXv.)”, in N.F.Bugai and others, eds., “1937 god Rossiiskie Koreitsy” (Moskva: IB RAN, 2004), 153.  
 
89
 Ibid., 154.  
 
90
 Syn khva Kim, Ocherki po istorii sovetskikh Korietsev (Almata: Nauka, 1965), 174-175. 
 36 
 
CHAPTER III 
COMPARISON OF THE IMMIGRATION POLICIES OF THE RUSSIAN AND 
SOVIET GOVERNMENTS ON KOREAN IMMIGRANTS 
 
1. Imperial Russia’s Policy: 1860 - 1917 
While the colonization of Siberia and the Transbaikal regions had already 
begun in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that of the Far East started only in 
the mid 1800s. Several events precipitated this colonization. In November 1856 the 
Maritime Province as a new territorial unit was established. This province, 
subordinated to the governor-generalship of Eastern Siberia, was the first step for the 
Russian government to develop the Far East. 
The further step was to conclude the treaties of Aigun and Peking. According 
to these treaties, which were signed with China in 1858 and 1860 respectively, Russia 
was conceded the Amur and Ussuri regions. In addition, based on the Peking Treaty 
the Russian-Korean border was first established in the South Ussuri region.         
During the 1860s the development of the Far East was determined by the 
initiatives of the local authority. The geographical distances from the center and lack 
of accumulated information on the Far East limited the interest and control of the 
Russian government over this area. 
Initially, the Russian authorities had planned to colonize the Far East by using 
Russian peasants and foreigners. The first law encouraging emigration into this area 
was enacted in 1861. The idea of attracting the Russian peasants, however, failed due 
to geographical barriers and the long and difficult transportation route from European 
 37 
 
Russia to the Far East.
91
   
The weakened will of the Russian government also served to discourage the 
plan to colonize this area. The lukewarm position of the central government over the 
issue of colonization of the Far East gave the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia full 
power in deciding the problems in these areas. As a result, Russia’s policy on Korean 
immigrants was inconsistently developed and depended heavily on the personalities of 
the governors who administered these areas, rather than on the opinions of the central 
government. 
In the 1860s, while the inflow of Russian emigrants into the Far East slowly 
progressed, the number of Korean immigrants noticeably increased in this area. For 
the first time, it was desirable for the Russian government that the lands which were 
never inhabited be developed by small groups of Korean immigrants. In particular, the 
Russian government positively evaluated that Korean immigrants should settle in the 
Ussuri region and actively colonized this area since this region was regarded as the 
most inhospitable area, and most Russian were reluctant to settle there. 
The first acceptance of Korean immigrants in 1864 was viewed as successful. 
As the number of Koreans who wished to immigrate to Russia increased, the local 
authority began to plan to colonize wilderness areas near the Korean-Russian border 
by utilizing Korean immigrants. The Russian authority thought that Korean 
immigrants would be useful laborers and important sources of cheap labor for the 
development of cities, as tenant farmers who worked for the Cossack and Russian 
communities, and as food providers for the Russian army.
92
  
Contrary to the initial immigration of Koreans during the 1860s, 1869 and 
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1870 were recorded as the years of mass inflow of Korean immigrants. During those 
two years about 5,700 poured in the Maritime region. This huge influx of Koreans 
alarmed the Russian local authority to take measures against the mass immigration. 
The local authority began to understand that the excessive influx of Koreans might 
cause not only political disputes with the Korean government but economic problems 
in this area. They were concerned that if the Russian-Korean border areas were 
densely occupied by Korean immigrants, the lands for future Russian immigrants to 
this area might be insufficient.
93
       
A military governor of the Maritime region, Prugelom, suggested that on the 
one hand, the Korean immigration should be controlled and limited, on the other, new 
Korean immigrants should settle in the areas distant from the Russian-Korean border 
such as the basin of the Suifen and Refu rivers. This suggestion was supported by 
Korsakov, governor of the Maritime province.  
The Russian government shared these perspectives with the local authorities. 
Stremoukhov, director of the Asian department of People’s Commissar of Foreign 
Affairs expressed opinions of the Russian government on the Korean problem in his 
letter addressed to Sinelnikov, Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, on 9 January 
1870 as follows: 
It was welcomed that the Koreans settle in the area designated by the Russian 
government. However, if the settlements of the Korean immigrants were 
formed near the Russian-Korean border areas, the Korean and Chinese 
governments might misunderstand the situation. The Korean settlements 
should be formed among the Russian villages to help assimilate Korean 
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immigrants, instead of concentrating the resettlements near the border areas.
94
 
 
In addition, after visiting the Ussuri region during 1869 and 1870, 
Przhevalskii suggested in his book published in 1870 that the Russian government 
suspend the acceptance of Korean immigrants or resettle Koreans into the Amur 
region. He also stressed that since the Koreans maintained strong spiritual ties with 
their fatherland, they were not likely to be assimilated.
95
 
In fact, these suggestions were incorporated into the immigration policy of 
the local authorities on Koreans. In 1870 Sinelnikov decided to resettle about 500 
Koreans who already had settled in the Ussuri region, into the Amur region. In 1871, 
103 Korean families (431 people) were sent to Blagoveshchesk and formed the first 
Korean village named Blagaslovennoe in the Amur region. They were given 100 
dessiatine of land as Russian peasants, accepted the Orthodox religion, and finally 
were naturalized in 1889.
96
  
Contrary to the arguments that the Korean immigrants be limited or resettled 
the inland area or the Amur area, V. Vagin supported the favorable policy on the 
Korean immigrants and criticized the Koreans’ resettlement into to the Amur region. 
In his article titled “Koreans in Amur,” published in 1875, Vagin described the 
Koreans as follows: 
The Koreans revered virtue and the Korean women were very virtuous.----
They were favorable for Russians and eagerly tried to learn the Russian 
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language and become intimate to Russians.
97
     
 
The resettlement of Korean immigrants into the Amur region where Russia 
and China shared the border caused a protest from the Chinese border authority. China 
requested that the Russian authority return Korean immigrants to Korea. The Russian 
government refused the Chinese request because there was no treaty between Russia 
and Korea and between Russia and China which prescribed the return of Korean 
immigrants.
98
     
All in all, even though concern over the massive inflow of Korean 
immigrants grew among the government officials, the position of the Russian 
authorities during the 1870s was that they did not completely stop the Korean 
immigrants; rather, they persistently allowed the Koreans to settle in the Maritime 
region. The reasons for the Russian government’s tolerating Korean immigrants was 
attributed to the fact that the Russian authorities thought the Korean immigrants 
satisfied Russia’s national interest, rather than damaged it. This stance revealed that 
the Russian government still needed to attract more people to develop the Far East. 
By the late 1870s several problems began to be noticed by the Russian 
government. First of all, the rapid increase of Korean immigrants worried the Russian 
government that it would loose control over the Koreans. Another problem was that 
the government lands were occupied by Korean immigrants with no approval of the 
Russian government. These circumstances compelled the Russian government to 
regulate the Korean immigrants by concluding the treaty with Korea.  
In 1880, the Russian government tried to contact the Korean border authority 
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to negotiate the issue on the Korean immigrants. Russia’s attempt, however, was 
refused by the Korean side.
99
 The Korean side simply explained to the Russian side 
that its government prohibited further contact with Russia.  
At that time, Korea was adopting its closed-door policy and concluded no 
treaties with foreign countries, except for China and Japan. However, Korea was 
forced to open its door by the repression of great powers such as America, Britain, 
and Germany. Between 1882 and 1883 Korea concluded treaties with those countries, 
with the mediation of China and Japan.  
In fact, Russia did not want any foreign powers intruding into Korea. 
Recognizing the suzerainty of China in Korea, Russia considered that it would be to 
Russia’s benefit if Korea remained independent from other foreign countries, except 
for China. However, China viewed Russia and Japan as powerful threats to its 
suzerainty in Korea, and actively worked to establish Korea’s diplomatic relations 
with Western countries to deter their influence in Korea.
100
  
As a result, in 1882 Russia began to prepare the establishment of official 
relations with Korea. The main issues which Russia wanted to address with Korea 
included the border problems, trade, and the status of Korean immigrants. Prior to a 
meeting with Korea, K.I. Veber
101
 was sent to the Ussuri region in order to check the 
living conditions and economic conditions of the Korean immigrants in that area.  
Veber described in his report that due to famine, flooding, and bad harvests 
about 6,000 Koreans had moved into the South Ussuri region, and that the Korean 
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immigration was not to be stopped, because if these immigrants were returned to 
Korea they would be executed. Further, Veber pointed out that unlike the Chinese, 
Koreans were faithful and eager to settle down in Russia.
102
   
On 25 June 1884 Russia signed a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with 
Korea. However, the issues concerning frontier trade and the Korean immigrants’ 
legal status were not included in the treaty.
103
 Then, Russia concluded another 
agreement with Korea on 20 August 1888 named “Regulation for the Frontier Trade 
on the River Tumen.” This regulation also did not decide the legal status of the 
Korean immigrants. The Korean government considered Koreans its people, 
regardless of their Russian citizenship, and continuously requested Russia to return 
Korean immigrants into Korea and prohibit the Koreans from crossing the Russian-
Korean border.
104
 Worried that if Korean immigrants were transferred to Korea, they 
would be executed, the Russian government continued to reject the request.  
Although Russia did not succeed in completely resolving Korean immigrants’ 
problems, by establishing diplomatic relations with Korea Russia laid the foundation 
to regulate Korean immigrants in the Far East. On the other hand, the Russian 
government enacted the South Ussuri Resettlement Law in 1882 in order to facilitate 
the colonization of this area by Russians. These two measures taken by the Russian 
government aimed at limiting the increase of Korean immigrants in the Russian-
Korean border region.
105
 
In the mid 1880s the issue of the Korean immigrants was at the center of the 
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discussion among government authorities. With the increase of Russian emigrants into 
the Ussuri region, the Russian government began to set a repressive policy toward 
Korean immigrants, with two important implications. The Russian government 
recognized the needs to take measures to eliminate unrest elements in the border areas 
caused by Korean immigrants and to prevent illegal occupation of government lands 
by foreign immigrants like Korean and Chinese people. In particular, the land 
problem was very sensitive since new Russian emigrants were secured to gain lands.  
In order to discuss the issue of the Korean immigrants, governors’ 
conferences were convened by Korff, the First Governor-General of the Priamur 
region,
106
 twice between 1885 and 1886. The conference was attended by governors, 
government representatives and entrepreneurs. 
The first conference decided that any further immigration of Koreans was 
prohibited and that the Korean immigrants previously settled in the border area were 
resettled into the inland area. The second conference reaffirmed the resolution passed 
by the first conference and defined the specific places of resettlement. For example, 
the Korean settlers inhabiting the South Ussuri area were forced to resettle into the 
Amur region. The Koreans who lived in the inhospitable areas such as Tizinhe, 
Yanchkhe, Sidimi, Fadash, Rezanova, and Adimi were excluded since these areas 
were considered inappropriate for the Russian immigrants to cultivate due to harsh 
weather conditions. In addition, the Koreans were to be prohibited from work in the 
gold-fields.
107
 
The important message which the second conference provided was that the 
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Koreans were regarded as unprofitable and even harmful since they illegally occupied 
the land. Further, it was proved that the Russian government had a negative attitude 
toward the Korean immigrants and was ready to carry out any discriminatory policy 
toward Koreans in the future. 
As a result, the resolution was endorsed by Alexander III on 22 November 
1886. The emperor clearly ordered the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Governor-
General of Priamur to review the measures to prohibit future Korean immigrants from 
settling in the Russian-Korean border areas and to resettle previous Korean settlers 
into the inland areas.
108
 
These resolutions, however, were not carried out, with Russia’ resuming the 
negotiations at the conclusion of the 1888 agreement with Korea.
109
 Another reason 
that the resettlement of Korean immigrants was not realized was that the local 
government was reluctant to carry out the resettlement. They thought that it was 
possible to proceed only under the condition that a fund to support Koreans’ 
resettlement would be established and the loss of properties of Koreans could be 
compensated. The most important reason for rejection, however, was their concern 
that if all Koreans were resettled into other areas, public works in their areas such as 
road construction and transportation would be damaged.
110
  
Unlike the intention of the Russian government, the issue on the legal status 
of Korean immigrants was not reflected in the two agreements signed with Korea in 
1884 and 1888. The basic position of the Korean government was that regardless of 
where the Koreans lived, they were Korean and were not to be Russian. Only the 
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1888 agreement decided that in order to cross the Russian-Korean border, both 
Russians and Koreans should carry passports with them. 
As the work to legalize the status of Korean immigrants continued to be 
postponed, Korff decided in 1891 to place Koran immigrants into three categories: 
Those who immigrated to Russia before 25 June 1884 were included in the first 
category. Those who moved into Russia after that date belonged to the second 
category. The third category was temporary travelers who were limited to a maximum 
one-year stay and who needed to get a visa to stay.  
While Koreans who were in the first category were entitled to obtain Russian 
citizenship and 15 dessiatine of land per household, those who belonged to the second 
and third categories had to leave Russia within the fixed period. The Koreans 
belonging to the second category had to dispose of their properties within two years 
and leave Russia. This decision, therefore, aimed at regulating and discouraging 
Korean immigrants, rather than laying the base to secure the legal status of the Korean 
immigrants. Delaying Russian citizenship to Korean immigrants well demonstrated 
what Korff’s policy intended.  
Contrary to Korff, however, his successors, Sergei Dukhovskii and Nikolai 
Grodenkov, performed the opposite policy regarding the issue of the Korean 
immigrants. Dukhovskii, who was appointed as Governor-General of the Priamru 
region in 1893, granted a grace period to the Koreans belonging to the second 
category, and also gave them the opportunity of naturalization. Grodekov, taking 
office as Governor-General in 1898, permitted Koreans who had lived more than five 
years in Russia to apply for naturalization.
111
 In addition, temporary residents were 
                                           
111
 Wada, 27. 
 46 
 
allowed to settle down in Iman, Khor, and Kii.
112
   
In the 1900s two incidents occurred which affected the Russian government 
policy on the Korean immigrants. They were the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and 
1905, and the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910. While the defeat of Russia in the 
war with Japan negatively influenced the attitude of both the Russian government and 
the public, the annexation made the Russian government enact a positive policy on the 
Korean issue. 
After Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japan War in 1905, Russian chauvinism 
and the notion of the Yellow Peril arose in the Far East.
113
 The atmosphere affected 
the Russian government. As soon as Unterberger was appointed as Governor-General 
of Priamur in 1905, he began to enforce a hostile policy toward Korean immigrants.   
His view on Koreans was clearly described in his book published in 1900. 
According to his arguments, the Koreans could hardly be assimilated by Russian 
culture and customs and they would act as spies for Japan when war with Russia and 
Japan would break out again.
114
 He was not only opposed to the russification policy 
of Grodekov, but also was hostile to the Korean immigrants themselves. He viewed 
Koreans as more dangerous than Chinese since Koreans sought to permanently settle 
in Russia, unlike the Chinese.
115
 He also criticized the situation of Koreans who 
accumulated capital and began to lend it to Russians.
116
     
Unterberger enforced several anti-Korean policies during his tenure: First, the 
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Korean immigrants could no longer to obtain Russian citizenship; second, even 
naturalized Koreans were reinvestigated; third, regardless of their legal status, no 
Korean immigrants were allowed to rent government land; and fourth, Korean 
immigrants were not permitted to work at the fisheries and gold-fields.
117
 
In response to the anti-Korean policy of the Russian government, a Korean 
society raised its voice of dissatisfaction with the Russian government’s repressive 
policy. In particular, the Korean newspaper Dae-Dong-Shin-Mun
118
 carried stories 
describing the benefits of Koreans for Russia and explaining that the “Yellow Peril” 
was not based on realities because all Koreans felt antagonism against Japan.
119
  
The anti-Korean policy of Unterberger, however, was changed by his 
successor, Nikolai Gondatti. Before taking office as Governor-General, Gondatti led 
an expedition which investigated the conditions of the Korean immigrants in the Far 
East during 1909 and 1910. The expedition refuted the opinions of Unterberger on the 
Korean immigrants, and concluded that the Koreans were viewed as “loyal, 
productive and assimilable.”120 In particular, V. Grave in the report of the expedition 
depicted the Koreans as follows: 
The Koreans are useful elements for Russia….Their inclinations to settle  
down and their abilities to cultivate woodland bring nothing but benefits to  
the Russian state…. After Japan’s annexation of Korea, their hostility toward 
Japan grew substantially…. So, Japanese propaganda toward Korean is not to  
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be feared.
121
  
 
The suggestion of the expedition was adopted by the government, and it led 
Gondatti to succeed the post of Unterberger. In fact, the argument that the Priamur 
region was colonized by “yellows” was overestimated, given the 1913 indications, 
according to which 66.84 percent of the land in the Priamur region was occupied by 
Cossacks, 32.96 percent of land was possessed by Russians, and less than 1 percent 
belonged to the Korean immigrants.
122
  
Concerning the proportion of population, moreover, the ratio of Russians 
overwhelmed that of Koreans. By 1917 about 748,300 Russians and Ukrainians lived 
in the Maritime region, while Koreans reached only 100,000. The massive inflow of 
Russian emigrants was attributed to the effect of the Stolypin’s land reform and 
completion of the Trans-Siberian railway.
123
 
Unlike the Russo-Japan War in 1905, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 
1910 made the public sentiment more favorable to Koreans. The Russian press raised 
a sympathetic voice for Korean immigrants, aligning with the opinions of the 
expedition. Newspapers such as Novoe Vremia carried articles supporting the 
acceptance of Koreans as Russian citizens and favoring land distribution to the 
Korean immigrants.
124
        
Gondatti reversed the anti-Korean policy of Unterbeger and began to launch 
favorable measures for Koreans. He helped the Koreans to obtain Russian citizenship, 
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and tried to eliminate the resolutions initiated by Unterberger that barred Korean 
immigrants from working at gold-fields and other construction places. On 2 
December 1910 the Council of Ministries permitted naturalized Koreans to work at 
the construction site of the Amur railway. In the following year even Koreans who 
made application for obtaining the Russian citizenship were allowed to work in the 
gold-fields.
125
 During the First World War, as the demands for labor rapidly increased, 
the Koreans could work more freely in the mining, metallurgy, and construction 
industries. 
 
1.2. The Soviet Policy: 1917-1937 
The Russian Civil War and the intervention of foreign countries in the Far 
East, which took place between 1918 and 1922, heavily damaged not only Russians 
but Korean immigrants and Korean activists. Even though the Civil War ended and 
the Japanese troops withdrew from the Far East, the power of the Soviet regime was 
not likely to be enough to overwhelm that of Japan in the Far East.  
The Soviet regime was forced to recognize the Japanese power in Northern 
Asia and the Soviet Far East. Regarding the Korean issue, the position of the Soviet 
government, therefore, was to not irritate Japan. After 1922, the Korean activist 
groups were disarmed by the Soviet regime. According to the request of Japan, 
several independence movement activists were arrested and transferred to Manchuria 
or Korea.  
The ordinary Korean immigrants living in the territory of Russia, however, 
were secured by the Soviet regime. According to the law on the procedure of applying 
for Soviet citizenship, passed on 22 August 1921, the number of applicants increased 
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from 11,589 people in 1922 and 1923 to 15,598 in 1923 and 1924. The number of 
naturalized Koreans gradually increased and the total number of Soviet Koreans 
reached 52,635 by 1926.
126
 
The Soviet government, nonetheless, began to review the Koreans’ 
resettlement into the Amur region, following the Russian tsarist government. The first 
attempt was made in 1925 by the Far Eastern Revolutionary Executive Committee. Its 
decision was similar to that of the Russian tsarist regime. According to the resolution, 
the Koreans were to be resettled into inland areas of the Maritime region and the 
Amur region during the five years following 1927.
127
 The background of the 
resolution by the Soviet regime was that the Soviet regime was also alarmed due to 
the continuous increase of Korean immigrants and illegal occupation of land by 
them.
128
 Another reason for alarm was that after the enactment of the land law in 
1922 the disputes between Russians and Koreans rapidly increased. The Russian 
landowners ceased to lend their land to the Koreans since the law compelled the 
landowners to till their land by themselves. Many petitions of Russian peasants 
concerning the Koreans were sent to the Soviet government. However, the first 
attempt was ineffective due to lack of administrative preparedness.  
The Soviet government continued to question that the Koreans’ immigration 
was encouraged intentionally by Japan. The conference held on 5 January 1926 and 
chaired by the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs decided that the inflow of 
Korean and Chinese immigrants was a serious threat for the Soviet government, and 
it caused a lack of lands for the Russian emigrants, and therefore the influx of Asian 
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immigrants was to be deterred.
129
  
The second attempt at resettling the Koreans was commenced by the 
resolution of People’s Commissariats on 28 January 1927. The resolution suggested 
that the Koreans no longer settle down in the Ussuri area and that those who had no 
land be transferred into the area of latitude 48.5° north of Khabarovsk and 
Blagoveshchensk, and that empty land be allotted to the Russian immigrants.
130
       
Based on the resolution from the center, the Far Eastern Regional Executive 
Committee passed the Five Year Plan on the resettlement of Koreans from 1929 to 
1933 on 13 April 1928. According to the plan, foreign Koreans were to be sent from 
the Vladivostok district to the Kurdatsinsk and Sizinsk districts of Khabarovsk.
131
  
The relocation plan appears below (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7: The Number of Koreans who would be Resettled According to Years
132
 
Years Numbers 
1928-1929 1,229 
1929-1930 5,000 
1930-1931 19,297 
1931-1932 28,619 
1932-1933 33,604 
Total 87,749 
 
 
As it turned out, the plan was barely implemented. Between 1929 and 1930 
only 2,750 Koreans were removed from the border areas, far below the target of 
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87,749 people.
133
 The plan was not well prepared and the Khabarovsk authority 
refused to accept the Korean immigrants due to lack of funding to support the 
resettlement of Koreans.
134
 Also, the collectivization which started in 1929 affected 
the implementation of the resettlement.
135
 
The protocol of the Executive Committee meeting of the Far East, held in 
December 1930, well described the view of the local government on the failure of the 
plan. Above all, the local government considered that the lukewarm response to the 
Koreans’ resistance served as a main cause of failure of the resettlement. In addition, 
the government emphasized the need to propagate the social and political importance 
of this plan.
136
 
Along with the plan to resettle the Koreans, the measures to restrict the inflow 
of Korean immigrants into the Far East were taken by the Far Eastern Regional 
Executive Committee. In 1929 only Koreans who visited relatives, or who performed 
commercial activities as permanent residents, or who engaged in agricultural work 
for immigrants were allowed to enter the Soviet territory crossing the Russian-
Korean border. The resolution which was passed on 10 October 1931 by the Far 
Eastern Regional Executive Committee strictly limited the entry of Koreans. Koreans 
who were invited by official Soviet channels were allowed to visit the Soviet Union. 
This measure was taken in response to Japan’s attack on Manchuria.137 
The issue of establishing the Korean Autonomous Oblast in the Far East had a 
great impact on the Soviet Union’s decision on Korean immigrants. This issue was 
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first initiated by the East Department of Communist International in May 1924, 
which insisted that establishing the Korean Autonomous Oblast would attract Korean 
immigrants and pose pressure on Japan’s colonized control over Korea.  
This request was reviewed and rejected by the Soviet government in 1925. 
The reasons for refusal were that the Soviets felt the weakness of their political and 
military powers in the Far East and worried more about the Japanese’ potential 
influence on the Soviet Koreans, rather than their influence on the Koreans who were 
under Japanese control. In addition, the Soviets were concerned about Japan’s 
requests of ownership over the territories of the Far East which were densely 
inhabited by Koreans.
138
 As a result, this atmosphere led to the Soviet policy of 
removing Koreans from the border areas.  
Along with the Koreans’ resettlement, the collectivization of agriculture, 
which took place from 1929 to 1933, heavily damaged the Korean society. While the 
Korean resettlement did not cause much effect in the Korean society due to its 
suspension, collectivization caused a massive outflow of Korean immigrants from 
the Far East. In particular, since almost 90 percent of the whole Korean population in 
this area engaged in the agricultural sector, the Korean community was damaged by 
the collectivization.  
Three to four thousand Koreans were stigmatized as kulak (the rich famer) 
and were deported to special camps.
139
 In addition, from several thousand to fifty 
thousand Koreans apparently left the Soviet Far East to return to their homeland or to 
Manchuria. Even though no official record exists to prove the exact number, an 
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estimated 10,000 or more Koreans left the Far East.
140
  
It is meaningful to note how the Soviet regime applied the Piedmont Principle 
to the Koreans issue. The project of formation of the Korean Autonomous Oblast 
served as an important metaphor to prove the success of the Piedmont. Unfortunately, 
this project was finally rejected by the central government in 1925. Also, the 
prohibition of Korean immigration into the Far East reflected the Soviet regime’s fear 
of Japan. As a result, the Soviet Union’s abandonment of the Piedmont Principle 
caused the forced deportation of cross-border ethnic minorities both from the Soviet 
Western border and the Eastern border regions.
141
  
However, there existed not only repressive but also moderate policies toward 
Korean immigrants in the 1930s. According to the Affirmative Action Program, the 
Korean national soviets, schools, and press were actively established. Compared with 
the time of Imperial Russia, the number of elementary schools opened in the Korean 
villages increased from 15 to 208 in 1929, and to 287 by mid 1935, accommodating 
21,596 students. In particular, while there were no middle schools in Imperial Russia, 
by the 1930s, 52 middle schools had opened and accommodated about 6,000 
students.
142
 
Moreover, three Korean pedagogical departments of technical institutes and 
one Korean-Soviet partisan school opened in the Far East. All materials and textbooks 
were published in the Korean language. In 1932 six Korean magazines and seven 
newspapers were published in the Far East. Among them, one newspaper, Sonbong 
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printed 10,000 copies every day.
143
 
All in all, during the 1930s, the contradictory Soviet policies deterred the 
political and economic developments of the Korean society, on the one hand, yet on 
the other hand these policies helped Koreans to conserve their national culture and 
tradition.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE DEPORTATION OF KOREANS FROM THE SOVIET FAR EAST TO 
CENTRAL ASIA 
 
1. The Prelude and Cause of the Deportation 
1.1. The Political Situation in the Soviet Union 
In the 1930s the Soviet government unleashed severe terror on its people. 
Under the passportization law, which was adopted in 1932, hundreds of thousands 
people were removed from the major cities such as Moscow and Leningrad. The 
arrested were regarded as undesirable and parasitical elements for the Soviet society 
and many of them were sent to the forced labor camps.
144
  
During the Great Terror of 1937-1938 about 3.5 million people were arrested; 
among them 1.5 million were imprisoned and 680,000 were shot.
145
 In reality, this 
purge targeted the whole Soviet population, including not only high ranking 
government and party officers and NKVD employees, but also the rank-and-file 
Communists, former kulaks, and naturalized foreigners such as Koreans, Germans, 
and Poles. In the end, ordinary people fell victims of this massive purge. 
Between 1935 and 1936, ethnic minorities who lived in the Soviet Western 
border regions were deported. The victims were Germans and Poles who inhabited the 
western part of Ukraine. In 1935 about 1,800 German and Polish families first were 
moved into the eastern part of Ukraine but, in 1936, 15,000 German and Polish 
families were finally deported to Kazakhstan in Central Asia.
146
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The cause of the deportation was that the Soviet government feared 
Germany’s expanded influence on Soviet Germans. Finally, the increased tension 
between Germany and the Soviet Union in the Western border regions and the Soviet 
regime’s excessive anxiety over Germany forced the Soviet government to take 
irreversible measures.  
While in the Soviet Western border regions Germany posed a threat to the 
Soviet regime, in the Soviet Far Eastern border regions Japan’s aggressive 
expansionism threatened the security of the Soviet Union. Japan’s attack on 
Manchuria in 1931 and the establishment of Manchukuo, its puppet government, in 
1932 was understood by the Soviet government as Japan’s plan to eventually target 
the Soviet Union to wage war.
147
  
At the 17
th
 Party Congress in 1934, the issue of the threat of Japan became 
the center of the discussion. Stalin himself expressed that the Far East region was in a 
state of semi-war. In particular, the Anti-Comintern Pact which was concluded in 
1936 by Japan and Germany sent a clear signal to the Soviet regime that Japan clearly 
saw the Soviet Union as its enemy.
148
    
In response to Japan’s threat, the Soviet government accordingly took 
repressive measures in the Far Eastern border areas. Based on the 1936 petition made 
by the Far Eastern local authority, the new border regime in the Far East region was 
officially adopted in 1937 by the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. As a 
result, the Soviet regime increased its military strength to intensify its surveillance of 
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the cross-border ethnic minorities and suspicious nationalities. 
The tension in this area escalated due to the Chinese and Japanese War, which 
took place in July 1937. The war signaled the failure of Soviet diplomacy, - in its so-
called status quo policy in the Far East. Having received Japan’s offensive toward 
China as a sign of real threat, the Soviet regime began to realize impending war with 
Japan, which resulted in the regime deporting all suspicious ethnic minorities from the 
Far Eastern border areas, as it already had done in the Western border areas between 
1935 and 1936. 
As political insecurity in the Far East grew, the Soviet regime paid special 
attention to this region. Between 1935 and 1936, the members of the Communist 
Party and NKVD were investigated by order of the central government, and as a result, 
about 8 percent of party members were expelled from the party, and several dozen 
members of the NKVD were arrested due to connections with the Right-Trotskyist 
conspiracy.
149
 
Along with the start of the Great Purge of 1937-1938, in July 1937 the head 
of the NKVD of the Far Eastern region was replaced by Genrich Liushkov, who was 
known to be the main actor in carrying out the mass deportation of Koreans. From 
then on, a series of resolutions on the mass operation was passed by the central 
government. The resolutions sought to eliminate anti-Soviet elements. But the 
meeting of the chiefs of the regional NKVD convened by Ezhov between 16 and 18 
July determined that the object of the operation included not only former kulaks, 
criminals, and White Guardists, but ethnic nationalities such as German, Poles and 
even kharbintsy.
150
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Another NKVD order No. 00447 issued on 30 July divided the groups of anti-
Soviet elements into two categories: executed or deported. The quota for arresting 
people was set from above.
151
 Even though national contingents were included in the 
target of the operation, this did not mean from the beginning the removal of the whole 
population of the suspected nationalities from the Far Eastern border regions. Also, 
until July, no documents suggested that the whole population of Koreans would be 
deported to Central Asia.  
Nonetheless, the decree on the Koreans’ deportation was issued on 21 August 
1937. From then until December of that year, all Koreans living in the Far East were 
removed from that area. As in the Western border case, the deepened conflicts 
between Russia and Japan in the Far East finally led to the mass deportation of not 
only Koreans, but Germans, Poles, and Chinese. Among them, Koreans constituted 90 
percent of total deportees from this area. According to the official record offered by 
the government, between September and December of 1937, 172,481 Koreans were 
deported, while 2,500 were arrested and sent to labor camps or were shot.
152
 
 
 1.2. The Offensive of the Soviet Regime toward Korean Society before 
the Deportation   
During the collectivization between 1929 and 1933, about 3,000 to 4,000 
Korean kulaks were deported.
153
 In addition, burgeoning conflicts erupted between 
Koreans and Russians surrounding the land problem. Although the Koreans, 
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collaborating with the collectivization policy, participated in establishing the Korean 
collective farms, they continued to suffer from discrimination and a heavy burden of 
taxes, compared with the Russian collective farmers.  
As a result, during the collectivization, ten to fifty thousand Koreans left the 
Russian Far East. Russian chauvinism began to revive in the Far East, and among 
Russians antagonism toward Koreans also grew. Numerous petitions of Russians 
requesting removal of Koreans from this region were sent not only to the local 
authorities, but to the central government and party organizations. 
After collectivization, offensive attacks on Korean elites began to increase. In 
reality, from 1932 to 1937 several thousand Koreans were arrested as undesirable 
elements, or spies for Japan.
154
 According to material in the KGB archives, between 
1932 and 1934 six Koreans living in Moscow were convicted of alleged subversive, 
terrorist, and counterrevolutionary acts. Among them, three were sentenced to death 
but later were rehabilitated.
155
  
In 1935 a massive wave of arrests, targeting Korean elites in the Far East, 
swept the Korean society. About 2,000 to 3,000 Koreans were sent to the gulag and 
corrective labor camps, or were shot. Within the larger framework of the investigation 
of Communist Party members of the Far East, between 1935 and 1937 several Korean 
Communist Party leaders like Afanassii Kim and M. Kim
156
 were removed from the 
party. While in 1926 the number of Korean Communist Party members reached 749 
people in the Far East, in 1937 the number was presumably decreased.
157
 
                                           
154
 Yi and Kim, 22-23.  
 
155
 Ibid., 22-23 
 
156
 Afanassii Kim and M. Kim attended the 17
th
 Party Congress as Korean representatives in 1934. 
They were accused of being spies for Japan in 1936 and 1937 respectively, and both were shot in 1938.  
   
157
 Kuzin, Dalnevostochnye Koreitsy, 113. 
 61 
 
In reality, from the mid 1930s, the Far Eastern authorities began to report to 
the central government regarding espionage acts by Trotskyist-activists and ethnic 
minorities, including Koreans and Chinese. Most of those who were convicted were 
sentenced to death. According to the report of the Military Tribunal on espionage, 
from 1935 to 1937 the number of Koreans sentenced due to espionage increased from 
27 people to 45, while the number of Russians similarly sentenced decreased from 36 
people to 11.
158
 
S. Kim who was deported in 1937 recalled that his father was arrested in 
1935, even though he was a party member and did nothing harmful to the Soviet 
regime. S. Kim regarded his father’s arrest as a prelude to the 1937 mass 
deportation.
159
 
At the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party held 
between February and March 1937, all participants discussed the danger of wrecking 
and espionage and agreed to intensify their vigilance against anti-Soviet elements. In 
a speech titled “Deficiencies in Party Work and Methods for the Liquadition of the 
Troskyists and other Double-Dealers,” Stalin underlined the conspiracy of internal 
and external enemies and warned that “the growing threat of capitalist encirclement is 
intimately connected with the problem of wrecking, sabotage and espionage.”160  
 
1.3. The Causes of Deportation 
The decree authorizing the Koreans’ deportation was issued on 21 August. 
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The deportation was swiftly implemented, and between September and November of 
1937, 172,481 Koreans were deported. What factors caused the deportation of the 
Koreans? The answer lies in the essence of the Stalinist state. The Korean issue was 
not isolated from other incidents but was organically connected with them. Therefore, 
the Koreans’ deportation must be analyzed within the framework of the Soviet politics. 
Scholars have discussed several causes as major factors in the deportation of Koreans 
to Central Asia: Soviet distrust of Koreans, preemptive measures against Japan’s use 
of Koreans as spies, and economic interest, such as the spread of rice farming to 
Central Asia. 
The Soviet regime clearly was apprehensive of the political situation in the 
Far East, worrying about the expansion of Japan’s influence on that area and the 
possibility of Japan’s use of Koreans as spies. From the mid 1930s, the Far Eastern 
border authorities reported that many Koreans, Chinese, and even White Russian 
spies sent by Japan to the Far East were arrested.
161
 In the second half of 1937, the 
local authorities and the NKVD continuously reported to the center that in the Far 
East Trotskyists and Japanese spies undermined the authority of the government 
organizations and that counterrevolutionary acts were also rampant.
162
 
In reality, many people including Koreans, Chinese and even Russians were 
prosecuted due to alleged rebellious acts and espionage not only in the Far East, but 
even in Kiev and Moscow. Among those who were arrested, many were arrested 
without specific evidence. After Stalin’s death some cases later turned out to be arrests 
of innocent people.  
Several examples can be found in the Far East and in Kiev of Ukraine. 
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Afanassii Kim and Mikhail Kim were Communist Party members of the Far East. 
They both attended the 17th congress of the Communist Party. They were arrested in 
January 1936 and in April 1937, respectively, due to their espionage for Japan and 
their counterrevolutionary acts. The prosecutions of Afanassii Kim and Mikhail Kim 
were re-inspected by the Soviet Supreme Court in March 1989 and in April 1957, 
which cancelled the prosecutions because no evidence could be produced.
163
     
In Kiev, some records were found concerning several Koreans who were 
accused of engaging in espionage for Japan and holding membership in 
counterrevolutionary nationalist organizations between October and December 1937. 
The accused included Ben-shu Kim, El-bum Kim, Ivan Nikolaevich Ligai, Kogai Sen-
un, and Ivan Spartsovich Kim, En-Ke Kim, and Don Bin Choi. They all first 
immigrated into the Far East, and then moved into Ukraine. Among them two were 
Communist Party members, one was a Komsomol member, and one was chairman of 
a rice collective farm. Given that only a few Koreans lived in Kiev, Ukraine, it was 
supposed that most Koreans who lived in Kiev were suspected, and many of them 
were actually accused of alleged espionage for Japan.
164
 
The Soviet press, in line with government policy, also carried stories 
regarding the espionage acts of Koreans and Chinese spies, and anti-revolutionary 
acts of Trotskyists.  Pravda, in an article published on 23 April 1937, reported that 
the Japanese government inserted its Korean and Chinese spies into the Far Eastern 
Border areas and urged the Soviet government to take appropriate measures to deter 
their dangerous activities. The report well represented not only the concerns of the 
Soviet regime on the political situation in this area, but its intention to stage war 
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against foreign spies and counterrevolutionaries.
165
 
Stalin himself suspected Koreans of being spies for Japan. Genrikh Liushkov, 
who was appointed by Stalin as head of the NKVD in the Far East to carry out the 
deportation of Koreans in 1937, commented on Stalin’s view on Koreans.166  
According to Liushkov, Stalin did not trust the Koreans at all, and said to him 
as follows: 
It is necessary to clean up the army and its rear in the most determined 
manner from hostile spy and pro-Japanese elements. …The Far East is not 
Soviet, there the Japanese rule. …It was necessary in cleansing the rear to 
terrorize the Korean districts and the frontier so as to prevent any Japanese 
espionage work.
167
 
 
No disagreements can be found among scholars that the political relations of 
the Soviet regime with Japan had a huge impact on the expulsion of Koreans from the 
Far Eastern border areas. Russia’s defeat by Japan in 1905 led to chaotic 
consequences in Russia and eventually led to the Russian revolution. The intervention 
of Japan between 1918 and 1922 directly threatened the security of the newborn 
Soviet regime. The Japanese assaults on the Chinese Eastern Railroad from 1933 and 
the Soviet Union’s sale of this railroad in 1935 to Japan exposed the Soviet state’s 
weakness in the Far East. Compared to the military and political power of Japan in 
this area, the Soviet Union was definitely at a disadvantage.  
The Soviets had a residual fear of Japan because they had won no war against 
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Japan after 1905. Therefore, in anticipation of Japan’s assault, they began to strongly 
suspect the Koreans of being not just potential, but actual spies of Japan.
168
 As a 
result, the unfavorable geopolitical situation in this area and the Soviets’ fear of Japan 
seemingly served as the main cause of the deportation. 
In addition, the fact that almost 90 percent of Koreans were concentrated in 
the border areas concerned the Soviets and reminded them of the issue of establishing 
the Koreans’ Autonomous Oblast in the Far East, which was rejected by the Soviet 
government in 1925.
169
 In reality, the Koreans’ concentration on the border areas was 
always recognized as a threat by the Soviet government and the Russian population, a 
threat which became known as the Yellow Peril. In the mid 1930s, “slogans such as 
Asia is a Yellow continent, or Asia for the Asians were spread in the Soviet border 
areas.”170  
In contrast, another argument proposes that economic reasons served as one 
of primary factors in the deportation of Koreans. According to this argument, the 
Soviet regime intended to develop the deserted land of Central Asia to expand rice 
farming there. The practical plan was to deport the Koreans. In reality, in 1928, about 
300 Koreans were invited to Kazakhstan by the People’s Commissar of Agricultural 
Affairs. The main purpose of the visit was to ask the Koreans to hand down the 
methods of rice farming. As a result, from 1931, rice farming spread rapidly in 
Kazakhstan.
171
 
In the mean time, from 1931 to 1933, about 1.7 million people were arrested 
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or died of epidemic diseases and starvations in Central Asia, and it resulted in severe 
lack of labor forces there. Therefore, the Soviet regime needed to transfer Koreans 
into Central Asia in order to complement the deficit of laborers.
172
 
There is no evidence to prove, however, that the Soviet government 
transferred the whole Korean population living in the Far East due to economic 
reasons such as the development of backward Central Asia. Given that the deportation 
was carried out in a very short period and the Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan authorities 
were informed only after the decision to deport Koreans, it is questionable to consider 
economic interests as one of the primary causes of deportation.  
One can assume that there should be very specific reasons for the state’s 
deportation of a massive population into other areas. However, under the Stalin 
regime mass deportation could be occur due to merely potential threats to the security 
of the Soviets.      
Given the information accumulated to the present, we may conjecture that the 
Soviets’ suspicion concerning the Koreans and excessive anxiety over external threats 
led to the Koreans’ deportation. In order words, the deportation was taken as a 
preemptive measure to defend the Soviets from threats of Japan.
173
 Just as a Germans 
and Poles living in the Soviet Western border area were deported between 1935 and 
1936, Koreans also were removed from the border areas in the name of eliminating 
potential threats.  
Regarding whether the Soviet regime had prepared in advance to deport 
Koreans, it is worth reviewing the resettlement plan designed between the late 1920s 
and the early 1930s. During this period, the Soviet regime attempted twice to resettle 
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the Koreans residing in the border areas into inland areas of the Maritime region or 
the Amur region, Khabarovsk. These two plans resembled each other in that security 
issues prompted the Soviet government to take these repressive measures based on 
Russian xenophobia and policies of ethnic discrimination. Therefore, the deportation 
could be seen as an extension of this earlier resettlement.  
However, clear differences exist between the earlier resettlement and the later 
deportation. First, the resettlement was proposed for political and economic 
considerations. The Soviet regime found it essential to remove dangerous elements in 
the border areas and secure lands for the Russian immigrants. Second, by resettling 
Koreans into more inhospitable regions, the Soviet regime planned to develop the 
devastated lands for productive use. The resettlement of Koreans was therefore 
viewed as a long-term plan.  
In contrast, the 1937 deportation was implemented mainly for political 
reasons. Above all, the deportation began like lightning and was finished in three 
months. There was no communication or coordination between the central and local 
governments before the deportation. Only after issuing the deportation decree was the 
central government’s order delivered to the Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan governments. 
Therefore, the earlier resettlement plan could not serve as evidence that the 
Soviet regime had long envisioned the Korean deportation plan. Rather, it is more 
likely that the Koreans’ deportation was carried out within the framework of the Great 
Purge. The emergency plan of the deportation toward all the suspected national 
ethnics living in the Far East was established just as the Great Purge began to target 
the national contingents as undesirable and suspicious elements in July and August of 
1937. 
In August of 1937, when Stalin met the chiefs of every level of the NKVD, 
 68 
 
the issue of Koreans’ deportation to Central Asia was discussed, and the specific order 
for the deportation was delivered to the chiefs of the Far Eastern Regional NKVD, 
including Liushkov who was newly appointed as a head of this region.
174
  
 
2. How the Deportation Proceeded 
It is unclear that the mass deportation of Koreans was planned from the 
beginning of the Great Purges in mid 1937. Given the correspondence between local 
and central governments, one fact is that the scope of the Korean deportation plan was 
expanded by initiatives put forth by Ezhov, the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs 
and his loyal henchman Liushkov, the head of the Far Eastern NKVD. 
On 18 August 1937 the central government’s draft proposal on deporting 
Koreans into Central Asia was sent to the Far Eastern local authorities. Then, only 
Koreans living in twelve districts adjacent to the border areas were included on the 
deportation list. But, in the final resolution signed by Stalin and Molotov on 21 
August 1937, the range of deportation regions was extended from twelve to twenty-
three districts.
175
 
According to this Decree No. 1428-326ss, the purpose of the deportation was 
clearly defined as a preemptive measure in order to prevent suspected espionage of 
Koreans working for Japan. The decree included several important points. First, 
Koreans who lived in the border areas were to be sent to Central Asia, primarily to 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and the deportation should begin immediately and finish 
by 1 January 1938. Second, unlike the special settlers such as kulaks whose property 
was confiscated, Koreans were allowed to take their movable property and were even 
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promised to be compensated for property left behind. Third, the decree allowed 
Koreans who wanted to return home to leave Russia, passing borders without 
obstacles.
176
 
In addition, the decree ordered repressive measures to quell any possible 
disorderly actions by Koreans. Based on the decree, Ezhov delivered special orders on 
24 and 29 August to Liushkov. The orders gave local authorities specific instructions 
in terms of the deportation. Order No. 516 on 24 August prescribed that local 
authorities should count the exact number of Koreans, forbid Koreans to arbitrarily 
leave their villages for other regions, arrest all Koreans who were likely suspected of 
connection with any outside or anti-Soviet acts, and create troika in order to speed the 
process of prosecution of those convicted. Also, according the order, those who had 
connection with the Red Army, the NKVD, or the military industry were not allowed 
to cross the border.
177
 
Order No. 535 on 29 August directly addressed the deportation of those who 
worked at the security organization. First, Korean Communists, Komsomol and other 
intelligentsia were deported together with ordinary Koreans. Second, the Koreans 
serving in low ranks of the Army, border guards and military officers were fired from 
their post at once. Third, the passports of Koreans were confiscated by the chief 
commander of the echelons, and new passports were given after the deportation.
178
 
Between 9 and 12 September, the first group of Koreans, who lived in the 
border areas such as Spassk, Posyet, and West Khankai, were rounded up. Their 
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number reached 51,299 people. According to Ezhov’s secret report to Stalin,179 the 
first group was transferred on 21 September 1937; among them 21,296 people were 
sent to Kazakhstan and 30,003 to Uzbekistan. On 24 September, another 24,000 
Koreans began to be rounded up, and were to be deported between 24 September and 
3 October. As a result, a total of 75,000 to 78,000 Koreans, or as many as 96,000 were 
to be deported, with about 25,000 Koreans still remaining in the Far Eastern border 
regions, including Vladivostok. 
Ezhov’s report had two important political implications. First, Ezhov 
suggested to Stalin that it would be dangerous and undesirable for the remaining 
25,000 Koreans to stay in the Far East, because by living so close to the border areas 
and the marine base, they clearly would become spies for the Japanese. Further, the 
deportation number planned by Ezhov did not exceed a maximum 121,000 people. 
This number included the original 78,000 plus the additional 18,000 plus the 
remaining 25,000. 
In response to Ezhov’s suggestion, the Council of the People’s Commissars 
adopted Resolution No. 1647-377ss on 28 September. The range of the deportation 
was extended to all Koreans living in the territories of the Far East.
180
 Also, only 
during October, an additional 100,000 Koreans were deported.
181
 
All in all, according to the secret report of Ezhov sent to Molotov dated 29 
October 1937, a total of 171,781 Koreans (36,442 families) were already deported to 
Central Asia, among them 76,526 were sent to Uzbekistan and 95,256 to Kazakhstan. 
In addition, about 700 Koreans still remained in Kamchatka and Okhotsk, and they 
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would be deported in the first of November.
182
 Within three months after the 
deportation decree was delivered to the local authorities, all Koreans living in the Far 
East were rounded up and transferred with 124 echelons to Central Asia. Even the 
number of deportees exceeded the number allowed in the plan. 
The deportation was secretly implemented by the Soviet regime, in order to 
not expose the deportation of Koreans to the outside world. During the deportation, no 
Koreans were permitted to travel to other regions, and transportation and 
communications among the Korean villages were blocked.
183
 Also, the local 
authorities disguised the deportation as a very practical plan, and never gave a 
forthright explanation to the Koreans. Therefore, it was natural that the Koreans 
understood the deportation in various ways.  
Some Koreans thought that the Soviet regime was deporting them to Central 
Asia because there they would find more favorable conditions for agriculture, while 
others thought that they were sent to Central Asia because the Korean Autonomous 
Oblast was established there.
184
 Some even thought that the deportation was a kind of 
agricultural resettlement, and that they would be sent to some regions not far from the 
Far East; hence they carried little food, sufficient for only a week or two. Moreover, 
some Koreans were told that they would be granted a tax exemption in their new 
settlements. Others were informed that if they did not resist, they could receive 370 
rubles.
185
  
Moreover, since there was no advance discussion among Koreans on the 
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deportation, and they were given only a short time to prepare for the deportation, the 
Koreans hardly knew what the deportation really was about. In reality, almost all 
Koreans were informed only one or two weeks in advance, or even a mere three days 
before the deportation, without being informed of their specific destinations.
186
  
According to the report of the Japanese secret organization, Kim Ki-hong, 
who lived in the Suchan district, was informed of the deportation on 2 October 1937. 
All the Koreans living in this village were ordered to finish their preparations for 
deportation by 8 October. Among them, 15 people who refused the deportation were 
sent to the border areas and were forced to leave Manchuria.
187
  
Jan Hak-bong, who was a student at the time of the deportation, remembered 
that Koreans gathered in the theater of Khabarovsk and there were informed of the 
deportation on 20 September 1937, and the deportation started on 25 and 26 
September. The next day, 21 September, when he went to school, the school teachers 
were arrested. In addition, he was told that the whole Korean intelligentsia, including 
government officers, journalists, and writers, were arrested.
188
  
In the beginning, Koreans likely hoped that only those suspected of 
suspicious activity would be deported. In particular, those who were members of the 
Party, NKVD, Red Army, and military who eagerly showed their loyalty to the Soviet 
regime believed that they were excluded from the deportation lists. Therefore, some 
of them even actively helped the local authorities to carry out the deportation.
189
 
Despite their desire, however, the central government decided to deport all the 
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Koreans living in the Far East without exception. Korean soldiers and military 
officers were simply dismissed from their post and deported.
190
 In addition, they were 
blocked from any opportunity to leave Russia.
191
 
As a result, regardless of their loyalty or utility, all Koreans were forced into 
deportation, giving rise to strong discontentment among Koreans. Some records show 
the Koreans’ mood upon deportation. According to Liushkov’s report addressed to 
Ezhov on 4 September, some Korean communists and members of the Korean fishery 
kolkhoz “Deviaty val” expressed their dissatisfaction at a conference held on 2 
September at the Reineik islands, that the deportation violated Stalin’s constitution 
and the Soviets’ nationalities policy.192 Another report of the Far Eastern NKVD on 
the atmosphere of the Korean society said that Koreans thought that the Soviet regime 
did not believe the Korean communists.
193
 In addition, a Korean Communist Party 
member, Boris Kang, insisted that Korean Communists should not be deported but 
only non-party members should be deported.
194
  
There were no records to prove, however, that the Korean society organized 
any collective and intense protests on the deportation by the Soviet regime, for two 
reasons. First was the repressive measures taken by the Soviet regime. In reality, 
during the Great Purge of 1937 and 1938, any kind of protest was considered a 
counter revolutionary or anti-Soviet act, so the Koreans dared not resist the 
deportation. Second, the Koreans did not see the actual picture of the deportation and 
likely believed the empty promises offered by the Soviet regime.  
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Unlike the special settlers such as kulaks, Koreans were promised that the 
Soviet regime would reimburse them for their unmovable belongings, and would 
supply transportation and extra money for the transit. Although these promises turned 
out to be empty, they served to smooth the initial protests of the Koreans against the 
deportation and, prevent any disturbances.
195
 The Soviet regime’s intentional false 
propaganda served to alleviate the resistance of the Korean society against the 
deportation. 
As a repressive measure to prevent any organized protests of the Korean 
society, based on the deportation decree, 2,500 Korean elites were arrested.
196
 They 
were regarded as leaders of the Korean society: Communist Party members, Red 
Army officers, government officers, and intelligentsia. Along with Koreans, 11,000 
Chinese, 600 Poles, several Germans, Latvians and Lithuanians, and a thousand 
Russian émigrés who were returned from Harbin after the Soviet Union’s selling of 
the Chinese Eastern Railway.
197
 The Stalinist regime’s tactic was to first remove the 
leaders of the society prior to launching an offensive against the whole population.  
Koreans began to be transferred by freight cars between September and 
November of 1937. The journey took one or two months to reach the destination of 
Central Asia. Most Koreans were not allowed to take enough goods for a one- or two-
month journey. Although according to the deportation decree the Koreans were 
permitted to take even movable property like livestock, none of this was possible to 
take because the train could not accommodate even food and small items.  
The memoir of a Korean woman, Park Ye-ji, well described the situation at 
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that time: 
 
In 4 October 1937 she departed and stayed one month in the train. She 
severely suffered lack of food, and ate nothing many days. Koreans were 
transferred with almost no medication and insufficient water.
198
 
 
In addition, there was no washroom in the wagon of the train. Koreans were 
transported under very bad sanitary conditions, which caused outbreaks of diseases 
which took a harsh toll on children and the elderly. One report sent to Ezhov on 16 
November showed that fifty-six sick children were discovered in the echelon which 
arrived at Novosibirsk from the Far East on 15 November. Among them six died 
because the local authorities paid no attention to the children’s conditions.199 In some 
case, the bodies of those who died in transit were simply thrown out into the field, 
with no opportunity to dig a grave and bury them. It was reported subsequently that 
several thousand people died due to diseases, starvation, and train incidents.
200
  
Korean families commonly were separated in the transport. Families which 
were part Korean and part Russian were entitled to not be transported. Yet when these 
families mistakenly were called, the mistake was not corrected and the Russian family 
members would submit to deportation in order to remain with their family. Although 
exact figures are not available, many suffered the emotional pain of separation from 
their families, an anguish which continued after they arrived at their destination. As 
Koreans who were separated from their families arbitrarily left the designated place, 
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many disturbances were caused in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
201
 
The exact number of deported Koreans is controversial. According to the 
official figure given by the Soviet government, 172,481 Koreans were deported and 
2,500 were arrested. However, some scholars refuted the official figures provided by 
the government, that between 1926 and 1927 about 250,000 Koreans, including the 
illegal residents, inhabited the Far East, and the number remained the same in 1937. 
Therefore, about 80,000 Koreans were sent to gulag labor camps or the corrective 
camps, or to some other locations.
202
   
Also, Liushkov’s secret report to Ezhov said that at the time of the 
deportation about 60,000 were arrested in addition to the 190,000 who were expelled. 
Of course, this figure included not only Koreans (175,065), but Poles (600), 
Germans (several hundred), Chinese (11,000), and party workers and military men 
(9,000).
203
 Still, all of these figures combined did not reach 250,000. Furthermore, 
according to the 1939 record of those populations imprisoned in the corrective labor 
camps, only 2,371 were Koreans.
204
  
However, it does not seem reasonable that about 80,000 Koreans simply 
disappeared or that substantial numbers of Koreans were arrested and shot. The 
argument that 250,000 Koreans inhabited the Far East before the deportation did not 
consider any changes in the Korean population caused by the collectivization. At 
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least an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 abandoned the Soviet Far East.
205
 Further, 
although the deportation was based on Russian xenophobia and became an ethnically 
based operation, its purpose was not to physically eliminate the whole Korean 
population.  
Still, questions remain concerning how many Koreans were allowed to return 
home or go across the border to Manchuria. The resolution of 21 August issued first 
by the Council of the People’s Commissars and the subsequent internal instructions of 
the NKVD on 29 September
206
 expressed that the local authorities should not place 
any obstacles in the way of the Koreans’ efforts to return home. If we look only at 
these regulations, it appears that if Koreans wished to return, they could do so.  
However, those who wanted to leave Russia needed permission of the NKVD, 
and in practice only a few Koreans succeeded in moving out of this area.
207
 In 
addition, as the border incidents increased in 1937 between Japan and the Soviet 
Union, the number of border troops was strengthened. As a result, Koreans seldom 
passed through the border areas with their families.  
Moreover, since the Soviet regime did not want the deportation exposed to 
the outside world, it did not easily allow the Koreans to gain freedom from the region. 
Therefore, under strict control of the NKVD, almost all Koreans supposedly were 
deported to Central Asia, except for the few who left early. 
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3. How Koreans Settled in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan from November 
1937 to Early 1938  
 
Among Koreans who were deported from the Far East to Central Asia, 95,427 
people were sent to Kazakhstan, and 74,500 to Uzbekistan. The rest of the Korean 
deportees were sent to the other republics of Central Asia or even to Stalingrad. 
When Koreans arrived at the destination, most carried no money because they 
spent all of their money in transit. Also, although the resolution 1539-354ss issued on 
8 September prescribed that the Koreans would receive 5 rubles per day during 
transference to their destination, and public sector workers would receive their last 
two weeks of wages as a retirement allowance after the deportation, only a few 
Koreans received money from the government before the deportation.
208
    
To make matters worse, when Koreans arrived at their destination, there were 
no accommodations for them, nor was there any food for these settlers. The Koreans 
were forced to stay outdoors for several days. They lived under an open sky or in 
temporary shelters which they were able to cobble together.
209
 Since construction 
materials were not supplied, even by early 1938, the Koreans made underground 
shelters by digging out the earth. The underground shelters, which reached 50,000, 
well demonstrated the miserable conditions Koreans faced.
210
 These inhumane 
conditions broke the Koreans’ health and exposed them to rampant diseases. Between 
the period of deportation and 1938, 40,000 Koreans died, most of them children and 
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the elderly.
211
 In 1938, the death rate of Koreans reached 4 percent, while that of 
children was almost 20 percent.
212
   
Although the central government ordered the local government to prepare the 
accommodations for the Koreans and provide them with needed goods, the necessary 
measures were not taken in a timely way by the local authorities. Various reasons 
included the bureaucratic problems, lack of preparedness and capital, and the local 
authorities’ misuse of the capital allotted to the Koreans for settlement purpose. 
Evidence proved that the capital was misused by the local authorities. For example, 
money allotted for Koreans was spent for local kolkhoz or even Iranian settlers, who 
were transferred there later than the Koreans.
213
  
Another problem that afflicted Koreans was that they never were 
compensated for their property or belongings which they left behind. When the 
Koreans left the Far East, they were given some receipts from the Far Eastern local 
authorities for reimbursement in their new settlements. However, either the 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan authorities did not recognize these receipts, or the Far 
Eastern authorities simply denied the request of the Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
authorities to send money for reimbursement.
214
 
Moreover, many Koreans suffered from lack of employment. With the winter 
season kolkhoz members could not work, and those with white collar jobs and 
laborers were in even worse situations. The report of the Vice People’s Commissar of 
Internal Affairs, Chernyshev, addressed to the vice Council of People’s Commissars, 
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Chubar, on 5 November, well explained the Koreans’ condition. According to 
Chernyshev’s report, substantial numbers of Korean laborers and former public 
officials were unemployed, and their situations were worse than those of the kolkhoz 
members.
215
  
Besides the above mentioned problems, the placement of Koreans did not 
proceed smoothly. In some areas, the influx of Koreans exceeded the designated 
number. Some Koreans left without the approval of local authorities to look for their 
families or to find a more favorable place. The work of relocating Koreans according 
to their past jobs took much time. In the case of Kazakhstan, the relocation of Koreans 
was completed between March and May 1938.
216
 Some Koreans were sent to areas 
which were located a thousand kilometers away from the places where they were 
temporarily settled. Most Koreans were relocated to agricultural and fishery 
kolkhozes. In some cases, new lands were allotted to Koreans, in order to raise rice.
217
  
After Koreans settled into Central Asia, they were not permitted to move 
outside that region until 1954 without approval of the authorities. Even though 
Koreans were deported as “administratively exiled,” they were treated as special 
settlers.
218
 After arriving at their destination, the Koreans received new passports 
bearing the sign of their residency limitation. Along with the residency restriction, 
Koreans were not allowed to join the Army and were barred from studying related 
national security issues such as science or technical studies. These kinds of stigma 
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were attached to the Koreans for a long time.
219
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has traced the history of Koreans’ migration to the Russian Far 
East and examined how and why Koreans were deported from there to Central Asia. 
This history of Korean migration and subsequent deportation bears geopolitical 
importance for the Far East not only for Russia but also for Japan, China, and Korea. 
Reciprocally, the political and economic dynamics of this region helped to shape the 
Koreans’ experience of migration and their deportation.  
The history of Koreans’ migration to the Far East has been comparatively 
well studied by scholars, including Soviet Korean historians. In contrast, studies on 
the Koreans’ deportation were insufficient until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. As 
government archives have opened their classified documents, scholars have gained 
access to new information which reveals the true nature of the deportation. 
Even though the history of Korean migration to the Russian Far East reveals 
some differences among the sources in the number of Korean immigrants, these 
discrepancies do not prevent the articulation of an overall trend of Korean migration 
and immigration policies of the tsarist and Soviet governments. Most sources have 
explained that the causes of the migration of Koreans to the Far East were due to both 
political and economic reasons. The maladies of the Korean feudal system afflicted 
ordinary people and as a result caused their migration into the Far East Area. Russia’s 
initial interest in attracting foreign immigrants led the Koreans to settle in this region. 
Hence the poor political and economic situation in Korea and Russia’s immigrant 
policy toward Koreans caused the number of Koreans to increase from several 
hundred in 1864 to approximately 200,000 in 1937.  
 83 
 
Unlike the Korean migration history, the study of the deportation is more 
delicate because of its political complexities. Many sources which were published 
before 1991 delivered only piecemeal information on the deportation since scholars 
were limited in their access to the Soviet government archives. In contrast, after 1991, 
many secret documents which were now declassified offered new challenges to 
scholars to reveal the truths hidden behind the veil for almost 55 years.  
According to newly opened materials, the facts surrounding who ordered the 
deportation, its background, and how the deportation proceeded began to be known to 
the public. The Soviet regime’s suspicion of Koreans, the Great Purge of 1937 and 
1938, and the growing war clouds in the Far East served as main causes for the Soviet 
regime’s decision on the forced deportation of Koreans along with other suspected 
national contingents, including Germans, Chinese, Poles, and Kharbintsy. 
The Great Purge of 1937 and 1938 which first attacked the high ranking 
officers of the Party, the NKVD, and military later expanded to target the whole 
population. The deportation of Koreans likewise expanded from the limited 
population living in the Far Eastern border areas to the whole Korean population 
living in the Far East. As with the Great Purge, in the process of deportation the 
extreme drive of local authorities to fulfill quotas designated from above served as the 
main cause of the broad expulsion of Koreans from the Far East. 
Besides the political implications, some scholars also have discussed 
economic reasons such as the development of Central Asia and the spread of rice 
farming. It is assumed that the limited information on the deportation
220
 and the 
beliefs that the deportation could not be explained by only the Soviet regime’s 
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suspicion on Koreans
221
led to their conclusions. It is worth noting that the Stalin 
regime could decide on mass deportation based only on the potential suspicion on its 
people. The most important thing, therefore, is to understand the Koreans’ deportation 
within the political framework provided by the Stalin regime.  
Also of interest is the correlation between the resettlement and the 
deportation. The book Stalinskie Deportatsii 1928 – 1953 (Stalin’s Deportation) put 
the Koreans resettlement of 1928 and 1932 in the first chapter of the Stalinist 
deportation.
222
 Historian Terry Martin believed that the Korean resettlement would 
have been the first ethnic cleansing if it had been fully implemented.
223
 Although the 
resettlement was different from the deportation in that the resettlement basically 
proceeded on a voluntary basis, and the issue on the resettlement was more closely 
connected with the land problems in the Far East, nonetheless the resettlement plan 
affected the forced deportation both from the Western border areas in 1935 and 1936 
and the Eastern border areas in 1937.  
The deportation swept away the living social and cultural base which Koreans 
had constructed over 70 years. During the transference and immediately upon arrival 
at the new settlement, several thousands of Koreans died of epidemic diseases caused 
by bad sanitary conditions and physical exhaustion. Ineffective communication 
between central and local governments, inefficient bureaucracy, and the tendency to 
disdain human rights exacerbated the challenge of survival for the Koreans.  
Still controversial is whether the Koreans were the object of extermination or 
simply were victims of resettlement policy or the Soviet war strategy. Norman 
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Naimark considered the Korean deportation as a kind of genocide.
224
 Michael Gelb 
described that “the Koreans enjoyed comparatively decent treatment” since they were 
given the chance to sell their possessions and obtain better supplies than the kulaks.
225
 
It is natural that those who suffered and barely survived the horrible deportation 
would regard the deportation as a kind of extermination of their lives. Obviously, 
Koreans’ experience could not be explained by any words, just like the experience of 
other nationalities and Soviet peoples who suffered from state terror and purge.  
Finally, the Stalinist regime never consistently implemented its nationalities 
policy. Although ethnic minorities were encouraged to preserve their traditions, 
cultures, and languages, the Stalinist regime never allowed national minorities to have 
their own political consciousness nor to be politically independent, so as not to 
express any distinctive cultures which could undermine the Soviet unity. The 1937 
purge of suspect nationalities such as Germans, Poles, and Koreans revealed that the 
nationalities policy of the Soviet regime was an illusion.  
Nonetheless, the Soviet nationalities policies had some positive aspects in 
that they encouraged Koreans to preserve their national cultures and traditions. For 
example, there was a remarkable difference between the number of Korean schools 
during the tsarist regime and during the Soviet regime. The Soviet regime provided 
more favorable conditions for ethnic nationalists to develop their education, language, 
and culture.  
The policy of the Soviet government to support the national schools and 
language was consistently carried out, after Koreans settled in Central Asia. The 
report of Ezhov addressed to Molotov in October 1937 suggested that the Peoples’ 
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Commissar of Education be placed in charge of establishing the networks of Korean 
schools. Another resolution decided by the Central Committee of the Uzbekistan Party 
in November 1937 ordered the establishment of new Korean schools and reinforced 
the number of Korean teachers.
226
 
Fortunately, the Korean society adapted to the new environments and 
improved their economic conditions. Their contribution to the development of the 
agricultural sector in Central Asia was great, and many Korean kolkhozes were 
rewarded with the highest appraisal. Also, after Stalin’s death, the restrictions such as 
the residency restriction and education limitations posed on Koreans were lifted, and 
more opportunity was given to Koreans. 
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APPENDIX  
THE NUMBER OF KOREAN POPULATION LIVING IN THE FAR EAST 
PROVIDED BY VARIOUS SOURCES FROM 1917 TO 1937 
 
Year The number of Korean Population in the Far East Area 
(Unit: people) 
Sources 
1917 1) 93,696 (among them, 81,825 lived in the Maritime 
region) 
2) 100,000 
Syn-Khva, Kim, 28-33. 
 
G.N. Kim, 168. 
1923 1) 110,280 (among them, 96.4 percent lived in the 
Maritime region, 3 percent in the Amur region, 0.5 
percent in the Transbaikal region) 
2) 106,817 
3) 110,480 
4) 110,300 (among them, 106,500 lived in the 
Maritime region, of them 94,100 lived in the rural 
areas) 
5) 120,982: only in the Maritime region  
Yn Gieng Be, 192. 
 
 
Haruki, Wada, 33. 
A.T. Kuzin, 53. 
G.N. Kim, 171. 1923 census. RGIA 
DB. F. R-2442. Op. 1. D. 1501. L. 
14ob. 
G.N. Kim, 172. GAKHK. F.P-
61.Op.1.D.580.L.7-9 
1924 1) 120,703 
2) 120,000 - 130,000 
 
 
 
A.T. Kuzin, 52 
Yn Gieng Be, 193. This figure was 
mentioned by Khan Menshe who 
worked at the Korean department 
of the Far Eastern Committee. The 
official report of this department in 
March 1924 said that 120,000 
Koreans lived in the Maritime 
region. 
1925 1) 140,073 
2) 114,885 
 
3)  140,073 
A.T. Kuzin, 52. 
Yn Gieng Be, 193. This figure was 
mentioned by V.E. Gluzovskii. 
Yn Gieng Be, 193. This figure was 
reported in an article of Korean 
newspaper “Avangard” in 1925.  
1926 1) 168,009 (among them, 86.6 percent lived in the 
Vladivostok okrug) 
2) 145,156 
 
3)  170,000-180,000 
A.T. Kuzin, 52. 
 
Yn Gieng Be, 194. This figure was 
cited by B.D. Pak 
Yn Gieng Be, 194. This figure was 
reported in the Japanese press.   
1927 1) 170,000 (among them 150,779 lived in the 
Vladivostok okrug, and only 1,800 lived in the 
Amur region) 
2) 170,000 
-* 250,000 
Yn Gieng Be, 194. Official statistic 
provided by the local government. 
Yi, Chae- mun, 129.  
This figure was suggested by 
Kolarz.   
1928 1) 176,800 Yn Gieng Be, 195. 
1929 1) 180,700 
2) 180,000 
3) 150,795 (*This figure was the number of those 
who lived in the Vladivostok okrug)  
-among them 138,267 lived in the rural areas. 
Yn Gieng Be, 195. 
A.T. Kuzin, 53. 
G..N. Kim, 179. 
1932 1) 199,500 A.T. Kuzin, 53.  
Chae-mun Yi, 129. GAKHK, F. P-
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2, op 11, d.233, ll.6-11. 
1934 1) 200,000 – 204,000 Chae-mun Yi, 129. This figure was 
written in the report of Ten Iakov 
regarding “works of national 
minorities.”  
1937 1) 172,500 
2) 168,000 
A.T. Kuzin, 53. 
Yn Gieng Be, 196. 1937 census. 
1939 1) 182,399 (*This figure was the number of the 
whole Korean population living in USSR) 
Yn Gieng Be, 196. 1939 census. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 89 
 
 
REFERENCES CITED 
 
Be, Yn Gieng. Demograficheskaia kharakteristika koreiskogo naseleniia Dalnego 
Vostoka (20-30-e gody XXv.), In Bugai, N. F. and others, eds., 1937 god 
Rossiiskie Koreitsy. Moskva: IB RAN, 2004. 
 
Be, Yn Gieng. Uchastie Koreitsev v pazvitii ekonomiki Dalnegovostochnogo regiona 
(20-30-e gody XXv.), In Bugai, N. F. and others, eds., 1937 god Rossiickie 
Koreitsy. Moskva: IB RAN, 2004. 
 
Bugai, N.F. “Chaeso Hanindul ui sunansa: haesol mit kwangye konmunso.” 
Translated by Choi Jong woon. Kyongido Songnam-si: Sejon Younguso, 
1996.  
  
Bugai, N.F. The Deportation of Peoples in the Soviet Union. New York: Nova Science 
Publishers, Inc, 1996. 
 
Bugai, N.F.  L. Beriia – I. Stalin: “Soglasno Vashemu ukazaniiu..”. Moskva: AIRO-
XX, 1995. 
 
Bugai, N.F., and others. Koreiitsi v SSSR, Materialy sovetskoi pechati 1918-1937gg. 
Moskva: IB RAN, 2004. 
 
Chong, Ok-cha, Rosia, Chungang Asia hanin ui yoksa. Kyonggi-do Kwanchonsi: 
Kuksa Pyonchan Wiwonhoe, 2008. 
 
Gelb, Michael. An Early Soviet Ethnic Deportation: The Far Eastern Koreans. The 
Russian Riview, Vol.54(July 1995): 389-412. 
 
Kang, Man-gil. Haesang ui yolcha rul tago: Koryoin kangje iju ku tonghan ui kil ul 
kada. Seoul: Hangilsa, 1999. 
 
Khlevniuk, Oleg. The History of the Gulag. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. 
 
Kho, Song-moo. Koreans in the Soviet Central Asia. Helsinki: Finnish Oriental 
Society, 1987. 
 
Kim, G. N. Istoriia immigratsii Koreitsev: vtopaia polovina XIX v. – 1945 g. Almaty: 
Daik-Press, 1999. 
 
Kim, P. G and Pang, Sang hyon. Chaeso Hanin iminsa: Stalin I kangje iju. Seoul: 
Tamgudang, 1993. 
 
Kim, Syn khva. Ocherki po istorii Sovetskikh Koreitsev. Almata: Nauka, 1965. 
 
 90 
 
 
 
Kimura, Hidesuke. “Korean Minorities in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan.” In 
Suh, Dae-Sook, ed., Koreans in the Soviet Union. Honolulu: Center for 
Korean Studies of the University of Hawaii, 1987. 
 
Krushanov, A.I. Istoriia Dalnego Vostoka SSSR: v epokhu feodalizma I kapitalisma 
(XVIIv.-fevpal 1917g.). Moskva: Nauka, 1991. 
 
Kulbaev, Tleu and Khegai, Arkadii. Deportatsiia. Almaty: Daneker, 2000. 
 
Kuromiya, Hiroaki. The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s Great Terror in the 1930s. New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007. 
 
Kuzin, A. T. Dalnevostochnye Koreitsy: zhizny i tragediia sudby, dokumentalno 
istoricheskii ocherk. Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Dalnevostochnoe knizhnoe 
izdatelstvo, 1993. 
 
Kuzin, A. T. Perekhod Koreitsev v dalnevostochnye predely Rossiiskogo gosudarstva. 
Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 2001.  
 
Kwon, Hui-yong. Segye ui Han minjok. Seoul: Tongirwon, 1996. 
 
Martin, Terry. The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet 
Union, 1923-1939. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001. 
 
Merritt, Steven Edward. “The Great Purges in the Soviet Far East, 1937-1938.” PhD 
diss., University of California Riverside, 2000.  
 
Naimar, Norman. Stalin’s Genocides. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. 
 
Pak. B. D. Koreitsy v Rossiiskoi Imperii (Dalnevostochyi period). Moskva: 
Mezhdunarodnyi tsentr koreevedeniia Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo 
universiteta im. M.V. Lomanosova, 1993.  
 
Pak, B. D. Rossiia i Koreia. Moskva: IV RAN, 2004. 
 
Pak, B. D, Bugai, N. F. 140 let v Rossii, Ocherk istorii rossiiskikh Koreitsev. Moskva: 
IV RAN, 2004.  
 
Pak, Hwan. Rosia Hanin minjok undongsa. Seoul: Tamgudang, 1995. 
 
Petrov, A.I. Koreiskaia diaspora na dalnem vostoka Rossii 60-90-e godu XIX veka, 
Vladivostok: DVO RAN, 2000 
 
Pobol N. L and Polian P. M. Stalinskie deportatsii 1928 – 1953: dakumenty. Moskva: 
Materik, 2005.  
 
Pohl, J. Otto. Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937-1949. Westport, Connecticut; 
 91 
 
London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999. 
 
Pohl, J. Otto. The Stalinist Penal System. Jefferson, North Carolina and London: 
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1997.  
 
Pozniak, T. Z. Inostrannye poddannye v gorodakh dalnego vostoka Rossii (vtoraia 
polovina XIX – nachalo XX v.). Vladivostok: Dalnauka, 2004. 
 
Song, Kum-yong. Rosia ui tongbuga chinchul kwa Hanbando chongchaek. Seoul: 
Kukhak Charyowon, 2004. 
 
Stephan, John. J. The Russian Far East. Califonia: Stanford University Press, 1994. 
 
Thiel, Erich. The Soviet Far East. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1957. 
 
Trotskaia, N. A. and others. Koreitsy na Rossiiskom Dalnemvostoke 1917-1923), 
dakumenty i materialy (Vladivostok: Izdatelstvo Dalnevostochnogo 
universiteta, 2004). 
   
Wada, Haruki. “Koreans in the Soviet Far East, 1917-1937”. In Suh, Dae-Sook, ed., 
Koreans in the Soviet Union. Center for Korean Studies University of Hawaii, 
1987. 
 
Werth, Nicolas. Cannibal Island. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
 
Yi, Chae-mun. Tongtoui diasupora: Rosia kuktong chiyok kwa Hanindule kwanhan 
sahoehakchokyongu. Taegu Kwangyo ̆ksi: Kyo ̆ngbuk Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'ansa, 
2007. 
 
Yi, Kwang-gyu, Chon, Kyong-su. Chaeso Hanin: illyuhakchok chopkun. Seoul: 
Chimmundong, 1993.   
 
Yi, U-khe and Kim, En un. Belaia kniga o deportatsii Koreitskogo naseleniia Rossii v 
30-40 godakh. Kniga pervaia. Moskva: Interpaks, 1992. 
 
 
